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INDIVIDUALIZING CRIMINAL LAW’S JUSTICE JUDGMENTS:
SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DOCTRINES OF CULPABILITY,
MITIGATION, AND EXCUSE
PAUL H. ROBINSON* & LINDSAY HOLCOMB**
ABSTRACT
In judging an offender’s culpability, mitigation, or excuse, there
seems to be general agreement that it is appropriate for the criminal law
to take into account such things as the offender’s youthfulness or her significantly low IQ. There is even support for taking account of their distorted perceptions and reasoning induced by traumatic experiences, as in
battered spouse syndrome. On the other hand, there seems to be equally
strong opposition to taking account of things such as racism or
homophobia that played a role in bringing about the offense. In between
these two clear points, however, exists a large collection of individual offender characteristics and circumstances for which there is lack of clarity
as to whether the criminal law should take them into account. Should our
assessment of an offender’s criminal liability be adjusted for their cultural
background? Their religious beliefs? Their past life experiences? The
pedophilic tendencies they have always had but usually suppressed?
The question of how much to individualize the criminal liability judgment is not peripheral or unusual but rather common in a wide range of
formal criminal law doctrines including, for example, the culpability requirements of recklessness and negligence, the mitigation of provocation
and its more modern form of extreme emotional disturbance, and the
excuse defenses of mistake as to justification, duress, and involuntary intoxication. Indeed, it turns out that the problem of individualizing factors
is present, if often obscured, in all criminal law doctrines of culpability,
mitigation, and excuse.
The Article reviews the appeal of criminal law adhering to a purely
objective standard, where the problem of the individualizing factors is
sought to be avoided altogether. But the resulting stream of injustices has
forced most jurisdictions to adopt a partially individualized standard in
some cases involving some doctrines. But this leaves the jurisdiction’s
criminal law in an awkward and unstable state. Without a guiding principle for determining which individualizing factors are to be taken into ac* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The authors
give special thanks to Sarah Robinson for her research assistance, and to the
participants in the 2021 Criminal Law Theory Seminar at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School for their many contributions.  Paul H. Robinson
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** Law Clerk to Judge John L. Badalamenti, U.S. District Court for the
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count under what circumstances, the law is inevitably unprincipled and
internally inconsistent. And without guidance, different decision-makers
inevitably come to different conclusions in similar cases.
The Article proposes a solution to the individualizing factors puzzle
and a statutory codification that would provide guidance in the adjudication of the many cases in which the issue arises.
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INTRODUCTION

OST would agree that an offender provoked to kill because of racial
prejudice, bad temper, or homophobia ought not be able to claim a
defense or mitigation based on that belief or disposition.1 The offender is
to be judged by the objective standard of the reasonable person, who has
no such weaknesses and would not have been so provoked. On the other
hand, when a battered spouse kills her sleeping husband mistakenly but
honestly believing that this is the only means of protecting herself from
serious injury or death, should we similarly judge her by a purely objective
standard? Or should we judge her by the standard of the reasonable person who has suffered the same battered spouse syndrome effects? The
latter approach—partially individualizing the objective standard—may
provide her an excuse or mitigation based upon a conclusion that from
her perspective she reasonably believed her killing was necessary self-defense,2 while the former approach—the purely objective standard—would
deny the defense, judging her conduct to be an unreasonable claim of selfdefense.3
While the criminal law has good reason to impose an objective standard in assessing liability, it must partially individualize the standard in
many cases in a wide range of doctrines if it is to truly do justice. To always
insist upon an objective standard is to assure a continuing stream of injustices. Certainly, desert retributivists would find this appalling and even
crime-control utilitarians ought to reject this because it would undermine
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby reduce its crime-control effectiveness.4
On the other hand, how are we to decide what characteristics or circumstances ought to be used in what situations as individualizing factors?5
1. See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (1st ed. 2003); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 781 (1994); Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 119 (2008); Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17
CRITICAL INQUIRY 798 (1991); Victoria Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on
Switching, Inequality, and the Idea of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361
(2004); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1179 (1989); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest but
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459 (1987); Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean Hydra,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435 (2010); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable
Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008).
2. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State
v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989).
3. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 8–9 (Cal. 1996); State v. Peterson,
857 A.2d 1132, 1149–50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474,
476 (Nev. 2000); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984).
4. See infra Section I.B.
5. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 823–24 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that the trial court was correct in refusing to permit expert testimony offered by the defense on “the role of honor, paternalism, and street fighters
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If the effects of battered spouse syndrome qualify as an individualizing
factor, then why shouldn’t a documented history of lifelong badtemperedness arising from an upbringing in a uniformly bad-tempered
family? By what principles are we to distinguish what ought and ought not
be taken into account? Even the thoughtful Model Penal Code drafters,
who recognized the importance of partial individualization, confessed an
inability to articulate a workable principle and concluded that they would
simply “leave the issue to the courts.”6
The Model Code drafters are not alone. In focusing upon a wide
range of doctrines, many scholars view the individualization problem as
perhaps unsolvable. “Given the importance of assessing negligence and
heat of passion in criminal law, one would think that courts and commentators would agree on which individual traits of an actor are incorporated
into the heuristic of a ‘reasonable person,’ ” Peter Westen has observed.7
“The reality, however, is the opposite. Courts and commentators despair
of being able to determine which individual traits of an actor are taken
into account in assessing his reasonableness.”8 Other commentators have
been even more forceful in their critiques of attempts at rational solutions,
especially those built around the “reasonable person” standard. In the
2001 case Regina v. Smith,9 Lord Hoffman called the reasonable person
test “logically unworkable” and an “opaque formula.”10 “A recurring problem . . . is the difficulty of how much to ‘individualize’ the reasonable
person—how to determine which characteristics of the defendant (physical traits, emotional dispositions, past experiences, beliefs, etc.) should be
imported into this ‘reasonable person,’ ” Jonathan Witmer-Rich agrees,
calling the reasonable person formulation a “deep conceptual problem.”11
Mayo Moran has described the individualization problem as, “somewhat
in the Hispanic culture[,]” because the court was “not prepared to sanction a ‘reasonable street fighter standard[ ]’ ”).
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
The standard for ultimate judgment invites consideration of the ‘care
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ There is
an inevitable ambiguity to ‘situation.’ If the actor were blind or if he had
just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would certainly
be facts to be considered in a judgment involving criminal liability, as
they would be under traditional law. But the heredity, intelligence or
temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and could not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity. The Code is not intended to displace discriminations of this kind, but
rather to leave the issue to the courts.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10.3 cmt. at 62 (AM. L. INST.
1980) (“[T]he word ‘situation’ is designedly ambiguous.”).
7. Westen, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Id.
9. [2001] 1 AC 146 (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division)).
10. Id.
11. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Heat of Passion and Blameworthy Reasons to Be
Angry, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 411–12 (2018).
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tortured, even ridiculous,” explaining that the Catch-22 of individualization is that its weaknesses are most obvious in those cases where individualization is most necessary.12 Christopher Jackson concludes that it is
impossible to conceive of an a priori method of distinguishing relevant
characteristics from irrelevant ones when trying to tackle the individualization problem.13 Angela Harris writes that making sense of the individualization problem is “less plausible today” than it was in the 1970s.14 And,
finally, Andrew Taslitz has asserted that deciding liability along the lines of
individualization is a “noble” aspiration that “can never fully be
achieved.”15
Perhaps worse, the absence of any guiding principle in dealing with
the question of proper individualization is not just a scholarly problem but
also the basis for regularized inconsistencies in the daily workings of the
criminal justice system. Consider a few examples:
• A twenty-year-old, developmentally disabled man in Maryland
has sex with a thirteen-year-old girl after she and her friends
trick him into believing she is sixteen. At trial, he is barred
from introducing evidence of the circumstances surrounding
his mistake as to the girl’s age, and he is sentenced to five
years in prison.16 Meanwhile in California, when a thirty-fouryear-old man who has sex with a seventeen-year-old believing
her to be over eighteen is charged with statutory rape, the
court allows him to introduce evidence regarding the circumstances supporting the reasonableness of his mistake. He is
sentenced to two years of probation.17
• Two women with battered woman’s syndrome are pressured
by their respective abusers to sexually assault their children.
One lives in Pennsylvania, the other in New Jersey. At trial,
the Pennsylvania court refuses to allow evidence of the woman’s abuse to be considered by the jury, and the woman is
sentenced to twenty years in prison.18 But the New Jersey
court admits expert testimony on battered woman’s syndrome
12. MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN REOBJECTIVE STANDARD 303 (2003).
13. Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 653 (2013).
14. Angela P. Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 131, 134–35 (2011).
15. Andrew Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore
Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 79, 80–81
(2011).
16. Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 799 (Md. 1993).
17. People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964); Ignorance of Age as Valid
Defense of Rape is Urged L.A. EVENING CITIZEN NEWS (Oct. 3, 1963) https://
www.newspapers.com/image/684552684/?terms=%22francisco%20hernandez%22%20sentence&match=1 [https://perma.cc/ZRD5-6KDX].
18. Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
CONSTRUCTION OF THE
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allowing the woman to successfully argue that she acted
under duress.19 She is sentenced to just two years in prison.
• A homeless man in New York is kicked in the head while he
sleeps in a cardboard shelter that he has constructed for himself. He stabs the person who kicked him, killing him, and at
trial is permitted to make a self-defense claim under the Castle Doctrine.20 He is given a suspended sentence and released on probation. Meanwhile, a homeless man in
California is threatened by a meth-addled man in front of his
regular sleeping spot, and strikes and kills the man.21 At trial,
he is not permitted to offer the defense claim made by his
New York counterpart, and he is sentenced to eleven years in
prison.
• A New Mexico man who served in the Vietnam War kills two
of his supervisors at work and tries to argue that his war-related post-traumatic stress disorder caused his actions.22
However, the man is not allowed to introduce evidence of the
effects of his military service, and receives a life sentence.
Meanwhile, in Illinois, a Vietnam veteran who shot his foreman after a dispute at work similarly claims that his PTSD
caused him to behave as he did. At trial, he is permitted to
introduce evidence regarding his combat duty and the ways in
which the noises in his work environment triggered traumatic
memories.23 The man is found not guilty.
Without some general agreement on how issues of individualization
should be resolved, the criminal justice system is destined to repeat an
endless string of such inconsistencies in adjudication. After examining
the problem and reviewing the current legal treatment of it, this Article
proposes an answer to the partial-individualization puzzle. While it may be
true that one cannot identify a list of factors to be excluded and a list of
factors to be included—our justice judgments are too nuanced for that,
and too dependent on situation and the interaction of factors—it is possible to provide some rather specific guidance for decision-makers judging a
specific case. The Article proposes a statutory provision that would guide
such individualization decision-making.
19. State v. B.H., 834 A.2d 1063, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003).
20. See Nikita Stewart & Jan Ransom, He Said He Stabbed a Student to Defend His
Home. His Home Is a Box, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/01/15/nyregion/homeless-stabbing-college-students.html [https://
perma.cc/SC6S-XDCK].
21. People v. Sotelo-Urena, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 262 (Ct. App. 2016).
22. State v. Simonson, 669 P.2d 1092, 1094 (N.M. 1983).
23. C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
and Criminal Behavior, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305, 321–22 (1984) (citing People v. Wood,
No. 80-7410 (Ill. Cir. Ct. of Cook County Ill. May 1982)).
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Part I examines the attractions of the objective standard and its hidden costs, the problem with a purely subjective standard, and the conceptual boundaries of the individualization problem. Part II catalogs the
many doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse in which the individualization problem arises and illustrates the challenges of individualization
with a series of real-world cases. Part III offers a proposed solution to the
individualization challenge that would apply across the full range of doctrines in which such problems appear, and also provides a proposed statutory formulation to guide juries and other decision-makers. Finally, Part
IV, building upon the analyses in the earlier sections, shows that the same
individualization problems so widely debated actually arise in essentially
all doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse, but are simply obscured in many.
I. THE ATTRACTIONS

COMPLICATIONS OF
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD

AND

A

PURELY OBJECTIVE

OR

The use of objective standards in assessing criminal liability has a long
history24 and is meant to serve an important purpose.25 Unfortunately, its
common current use produces a stream of avoidable injustices leaving one
to wonder why use of an objective standard is so regularly tolerated. On
the other hand, a purely subjective standard would be clearly intolerable.
A. The Attraction of an Objective Standard
For centuries, Anglo-American criminal law has expressed a clear
preference for defining individual criminal liability with an objective standard of reasonableness.26 It is easy to see why. First, consider the purposes for which criminal law is designed. It is in large part a
communicative tool to tell people what they cannot do, or are required to
do, under threat of criminal punishment.27 Where the law takes into account “the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education
24. See R. v. Jones (1703) 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (the case widely regarded as the
origin of the “reasonable person standard” in the criminal law, where the Queen’s
Bench refused to convict a trickster who deceived a man with such an obvious ruse
that the court decided the trickster’s conduct could not possibly be criminal. Deceit would only be criminal if it were such that a cheat as a person of “any ordinary
care or prudence” can’t discover or guard against, the court held).
25. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 493 (8th ed. 2018)
(“The more subjective the standard becomes, the greater the risk that the normative message of the criminal law will be lost. At some point, a defendant’s real
claim seemingly is not that he is acting justifiably, but rather that he should be
excused because he has done the best he can, given his unusual mental or emotional characteristics.”).
26. See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949,
949 (1985); see generally MORAN, supra note 12 (explaining that objective concepts
of reasonableness pervade American and English law).
27. See ANTONY DUFF & ROBERT ALEXANDER DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 141–42 (2001).
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which make the internal character of a given act so different in different
men,” it may not be able to clearly and effectively communicate to the
public what they are prohibited from doing or what they must do.28 In
other words, people cannot guide their behavior according to a standard
that is so particularized that they are unsure whether or not it applies to
them. In that sense, objectivity is crucial to the legibility of the criminal
law for everyday application by the ordinary person.29
Further, as a practical matter, people will be more able to apply the
criminal law rules to the situation at hand when the rules themselves are
more objective, especially when the actor must make a quick decision.30
28. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
29. Compare, for example, the German and American versions of the selfdefense justification. The German formulation provides, “Whoever commits an
act in self-defence [sic] does not act unlawfully . . . . ‘Self-defence’ [sic] means any
defensive action which is necessary to avert a present unlawful attack on oneself or
another.” STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [Penal Code], § 32, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0186 [https://
perma.cc/G2Y3-V3JB] (Ger.). This articulation of self-defense applies where its
requirements are objectively fulfilled. See Tatjana Hörnle, Social Expectations in the
Criminal Law: The “Reasonable Person” in a Comparative Perspective, 11 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2008). Where an actor is threatened by a present, unjustified attack,
and defensive action is necessary to avert that attack, an actor is entitled to carry
out an active defense, even if it is potentially deadly. Id. The American formulation, however, is far less straightforward, providing that:
[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force . . . . [a] person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is used . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1), (3)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985). By consulting the actor’s beliefs and estimations, the standard’s requirements appear more opaque
and uncertain, and it is less clear what the criminal law is attempting to communicate to the public. See Fletcher, supra note 26, at 955. Which beliefs and estimations are appropriate and which are not? Will a combat veteran’s estimation of the
necessity of force be viewed in the same light as the estimation of an octogenarian
who has been skittish all his life? This highly subjectivized standard, focusing on
the actor instead of the act, might be confusing to would-be perpetrators. So, the
more objective the description in the criminal law, the clearer the prohibition.
30. Consider, for example, the case of a black man who purchases a home for
his family in a predominantly white suburb in Maryland in the 1970s. Law v. State,
318 A. 2d 859, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). Shortly after moving in, the man’s
home is broken into a by racist neighbors who take significant amounts of personal
property in order to communicate their discontent with a black family living next
door. On another night, when the man hears what he believes to be someone
trying to unlock his back door and break in again, he grabs his gun and prepares
to shoot the would-be perpetrator through the door. He must act quickly; any
delay might allow the person outside to get into the house. Perhaps, though, just
as he’s aiming his gun, he begins to doubt whether the law permits him to shoot
the person. Maybe he knows that a self-defense justification would allow him to
protect himself in his home without retreating, but this intruder is technically outdoors, on the other side of the door. Would he still be permitted to shoot? Or
maybe he knows that self-defense requires an imminent threat, but the person
outside does not seem to be armed or particularly violent. Perhaps the intruder is
not really an intruder, but is just lost or confused? If that’s the case, and the home-
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Applying the law is often challenging even for intelligent, thoughtful
adults.31 If appropriate standards of conduct are not clearly defined in
objective terms, people will struggle to apply the rules, rendering them
unable to quickly and effectively respond to threats or to avoid mistakes.32
Objective rules, then, work better to tell people what they can, cannot, and
must do on a particular occasion.33
Still further, in judging criminal liability for violations, purely objective criteria are more likely to provide uniformity in application by different decision-makers.34 The objective standard promotes what is a most
fundamental feature of the America law—that “to apply a law justly to different cases is simply to take seriously the assertion that what is to be applied in different cases is the same general rule.”35
Finally, an objective standard seems to best embody democratic principles: everyone ought to be bound and judged by the same legislativelyprovided criminal law rules.36 To allow different rules for different people, because of the exercise of judicial discretion, for example, can too
easily produce unjustified disparity between similar cases and shelter unfair biases that may privilege one person or group over another.37 Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in
part to ensure a criminal code applied equally to everyone regardless of
race, ethnicity, or other such factors.38 Further, the Supreme Court has
held that the government “may not . . . selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”39 Thus, where criminal law standards endorse subjectivity by
taking into account defendants’ diverse backgrounds, for example, they
risk violating fundamental notions of equal protection.40
owner guesses wrong, is his conduct still lawful? Making the wrong choice about
how to apply the criminal law to the situation at hand could result in the homeowner’s death or his imprisonment.
31. See Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (1990) [hereinafter Rules of Conduct and Principles of
Adjudication].
32. See id. at 731.
33. See id. at 732.
34. See id. at 770.
35. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW 155–57 (1961).
36. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 64 (2012).
37. CHARLES W. OSTROM, BRIAN J. OSTROM & MATTHEW KLEIMAN, JUDGES AND
DISCRIMINATION: ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING
(2004), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204024.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UZ35-BWPF].
38. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberal’s Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1130–31 (1996).
39. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989).
40. PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 437–38 (3rd ed. 1992).
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Some have explained that they endorse an objective standard as a
means of ensuring that the standard remains grounded in external criteria
that are accessible to everyone.41 These writers argue that the concept of
reasonableness, for example, relies on prevailing social norms and therefore should not stray from the common knowledge of every citizen.42 As
one commentator explains, the advantage of the objective standard is that
“each member of the community is held equally to one standard of conduct: that of a reasonable person.”43 Professor George Fletcher, who devoted much of his work to comparing the American and German
reasonable person standards, has argued that objectivity allows for universalizable standards that can be relied upon by future actors in similar circumstances to guide their conduct accordingly.44 A subjectivized claim, in
contrast, offers no possibilities for transmutation into widely applicable
doctrine as it is limited to the specific personal characteristics of a single
individual. In light of these myriad attractions, it is not surprising that so
many scholars have expressed support for exclusive use of an objective
standard.
B. Hidden Costs: Regularized Injustice and Undermining Effective CrimeControl
Against these benefits of an objective standard are several significant
costs, which have not always been understood or appreciated. Namely, a
purely objective standard will produce a constant stream of injustices, as
those offenders who cannot reasonably be expected to meet the objective
standard are nonetheless held criminally liable. For these individuals, an
ostensibly neutral standard is unfair because it asks them to rise to a level
of conduct of which they are not realistically capable.
Compare, for example, two cases of statutory rape from the 1970s. In
the first case, the offender is a twenty-year-old man named Raymond Garnett who has an intellectual disability and a tested IQ of fifty-two.45 Garnett’s teachers report that he has the emotional and cognitive maturity of
a middle schooler.46 One evening, he meets a thirteen-year-old girl who
lives in his neighborhood—functionally, his own age—and the girl and
her friends tell Garnett that she is sixteen years old. Over the next several
months, the two become very close, and one night the girl invited Garnett
41. See, e.g., Robert Unikel, Comment, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 329 (1992)
(explaining that men are ill-equipped to judge the perspective of a “reasonable
woman” or a “reasonable battered woman” and should not be required to do so).
42. Id. at 367.
43. Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate
Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense and the
Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 198 (1995).
44. George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1269, 1304 (1974).
45. Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 798 (Md. 1993).
46. Id.
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over and helps him climb into her bedroom window. They talk for hours
and at one point engage in sexual intercourse. After the girl’s mother
finds out, Garnett is arrested for statutory rape.
In the second case, a fifteen-year-old girl runs away from home and
moves in with a twenty-nine-year-old man named Brent Walker who she
met while both were employed at a supermarket.47 She tells Walker that
she is nineteen years old. The pair have sex more than seventy-five times,
always initiated by Walker. Ultimately, a detective looking for the girl on
behalf of her parents finds her at Walker’s apartment and Walker is
charged with statutory rape. In both cases, the court holds that a mistake
of age defense is unavailable. Both men are convicted of the same offense
and receive the same sentence. But are the two similar enough to be
treated identically?
In the first case, the young man has an intellectual disability, is the
same age emotionally and cognitively as the girl, believes he is just four
years older than her, and has sex with her just one time. Given his disability, it is not clear that we reasonably could have expected him to have
understood and avoided the offense. In the second case, the man is not
disabled, is fourteen years older than the girl, and has sex with her more
than seventy-five times. In the first case, the man is at best negligent with
respect to the girl’s age—if he has any culpability at all—and in the second case, the man is certainly reckless if not knowing with respect to the
girl’s age. Treating the two cases uniformly under an objective, reasonable
person standard does not mete out punishment in accordance with blameworthiness proportionality. As Edwin Keedy noted in 1908 about cases
like Garnett, “[s]uch a result is contrary to fundamental principles, and is
plainly unjust, for a man should not be held criminal because of lack of
intelligence.”48 Rather, as Keedy proposed, the criterion should be
whether the defendant “[d]id . . . his best according to his own lights,” or,
more plainly, did the defendant act up to his own standard?49
Retributivists would obviously oppose liability and punishment disproportionate to blameworthiness.50 But crime-control utilitarians should
also be concerned about such results of applying a purely objective standard because the stream of injustices that it produces will incrementally
47. Walker v. State, 768 A.2d 631, 632 (Md. 2001).
48. Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L.
REV. 75, 84 (1908).
49. Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J.
Ladd trans. 1965) (1797); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie
trans. 1887) (1797); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds
of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433 (R.A. Duff &
Stuart Green ed., 2011); Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That
Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448 (1990); Jean Hampton, Correcting
Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992);
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).

2022]

INDIVIDUALIZING JUSTICE JUDGMENTS

285

undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community, and
in turn, reduce the public’s willingness to comply with criminal law, to
defer to its demands, and to internalize its norms.51 The utilitarian crimecontrol opposition to such injustices wants to logically follow from two discrete dynamics: first, doing injustice as the community perceives it undermines the criminal law’s moral credibility; second, such reduced moral
credibility diminishes the community’s willingness to defer, acquiesce, and
comply with the criminal law’s commands and to internalize its norms.52
The first dynamic—that the perceived moral credibility of the criminal law depends on the degree to which it tracks ordinary people’s intuitions of blameworthiness—is fairly commonsensical. That is, where the
justice system imposes criminal liability and punishment that is significantly greater or lesser than the ordinary person would think appropriate,
it loses moral credibility with the community. This commonsense proposition has strong foundations in empirical research.53
The second part of the crime-control dynamic follows from the fact
that a reduction in the perceived moral credibility of the justice system
reduces the criminal law’s ability to gain compliance, deference, and internalization of its norms. The archetypal example of this dynamic is the
U.S. Prohibition era of the early twentieth century. In 1920, Congress prohibited the sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol within the
U.S. with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. Demand for alcohol
remained high, however, and illegal stills, bootlegging operations, and
speakeasies flourished. Even government officials openly ignored the Prohibition rules. The public displays of disrespect for the criminal law reinforced public disillusionment with it, and not just disrespect for the
Prohibition rules. It also reduced compliance with criminal law rules un51. See Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing
Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1093 (2011).
52. See Paul H. Robinson & Lindsay Holcomb, In Defense of Moral Credibility
(forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter In Defense of Moral Credibility], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3775666 [https://perma.cc/PW2WRBGC].
53. See, e.g., Jean Landis & Lynne Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated
Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 675,
676–77 (1986) (finding that “routine departures from legalistic principles of due
process create in the consumer a sense of injustice that undermines the legitimacy
of legal authorities and thereby allows justification for past criminal activity and
increases the likelihood of future criminality”); Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler &
Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 438, 493–95
(1988) (finding that defendants had more confidence in the outcome of their case
and trust in the criminal justice system where they felt that their sentence was fair);
JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE
xii (1972) (finding that the effect of plea bargaining was to undercut the moral
authority of the criminal justice system and contribute to defendant cynicism);
Tracey L. Meares, Tom R. Tyler & Jacob Gardener, Lawful or Fair? How Cops and
Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 297, 321, 333
(2016) (finding that the perceived legitimacy of policing is based how people see
officers exercising their authority and how professional they appear).
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related to alcohol.54 The point is that a diminution in criminal law’s
moral credibility with the community prevents the law from harnessing the
powerful crime-control forces of social influence and internalized norms,
thereby reducing the criminal law’s crime-control effectiveness.55
There exist many other real-world examples of the disillusionmentcompliance connection. Consider the 1960s Watts neighborhood of Los
Angeles, where violations of the criminal law were increasingly met with
charges and sentences that seemed to residents grossly disproportionate.
The aggressive policing and punishment did not reduce crime, as intended, but rather increased it,56 as the criminal law’s credibility within
the neighborhood increasingly weakened. In August 1965, this tension
came to a boiling point after a Watts resident’s violent encounter with the
police inspired the community to take to the streets. An official investigation of the Watts riots conducted by the California Governor found that
the riot was a result of the Watts community’s long-growing grievances and
discontent with criminal law enforcement.57
To give an example relevant to the recent COVID-19 pandemic, in
1918, as the Spanish Flu swept through the U.S., communities across the
country instituted a number of public health measures to slow the spread.
Foremost among these was mask wearing.58 However, many people were
unpersuaded that the inconvenience and the intrusiveness of the government action was justified by its supposed health benefits. When some local
governments imposed mandatory mask ordinances and punished those
54. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND
LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW 139–63 (2015).
55. For a general discussion, see Robinson & Holcomb, supra note 52.
56. See James Queally, Watts Riots: Traffic Stop Was the Spark that Ignited Days of
Destruction in L.A., L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/
GW77-JVRP] (explaining that “[a]nger and distrust between Watts’ residents, the
police, and city officials had been simmering for years” and that many Watts residents suggested that the “riot had been triggered by long-smoldering resentment
against alleged police brutality”); see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME 108 (2017) (arguing that “haphazard, undisciplined, and aggressive police response only spawned an ever-more-violent reaction,” and warning that aggressive policing had backfired by “starting guerilla war
in the streets”).
57. See Watts Riots, C.R. DIGITAL LIBR., http://crdl.usg.edu/events/
watts_riots/?Welcome [https://perma.cc/H3KW-6A2S] (last updated Jan. 7,
2021).
58. See James Rolph, Proclamation of Mayor Asks Masks For All, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
22, 1918, at 8, available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/1620flu.0009.261/1
[https://perma.cc/FW5Z-GUFX] (reporting that San Francisco Mayor James
Rolph told citizens, “Conscience, patriotism and self-protection demand immediate and rigid compliance”); John Davie, Wear Mask, Says Law, Or Face Arrest, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 25, 1918, at 9, available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/
8540flu.0007.458/1/--wear-mask-says-law-or-face-arrest?rgn=fullext;view=image
[https://perma.cc/JP3X-H55P] (reporting that Oakland Mayor John Davie explained to his constituents, “It is sensible and patriotic, no matter what our personal beliefs may be, to safeguard our fellow citizens by joining in this practice”).
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who flouted the law with jail terms and fines,59 many in the community
resisted, seeing the mask mandates as excessive and the punishments unfair. This sparked protests en masse and widespread distrust of the legal
system. In fact, irritated as they were by the mask ordinances and their
associated criminal penalties, people took more and more liberties, hosting large gatherings, and refusing to wear masks properly (or refusing to
wear masks at all) even when under the scrutiny of officers.60 Crimes in
other areas of life rose as well; prostitution expanded, as did drug consumption and attacks on immigrants.61 Without buy-in from the community generally, greater enforcement served only to provoke greater
resistance and reduce compliance.
This dynamic between disillusionment with the criminal law and a
failure to comply with the criminal law’s demands has been confirmed by
ample controlled social psychology studies, wherein even small incremental loss in moral credibility has been shown to produce a corresponding
incremental loss in deference and compliance.62 Consider, for example, a
study using a within-subjects design63 in which subjects were asked a number of questions relating to various ways in which moral credibility is
thought to affect deference, compliance, and the internalization of the
law’s norms. Will subjects assist police by reporting a crime? Will subjects
assist in the investigation and prosecution of a crime? Do subjects take the
imposition of criminal liability and punishment as a reliable sign that the
defendant has done something truly condemnable? Do subjects take the
extent of the liability imposed as a reliable indication of the seriousness of
the offense and the blameworthiness of the offender? Subjects were tested
on these issues; then, with a baseline established, subjects were disillusioned with the criminal law by exposing them to the system’s failures of
justice and perpetrations of injustice. Later retesting showed that the
measures of deference, compliance, and internalization of norms had all
decreased among the disillusioned subjects.64
59. See J. Alexander Navarro, Mask Resistance During a Pandemic Isn’t New—In
1918 Many Americans Were “Slackers”, MICH. HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2020), https://
healthblog.uofmhealth.org/wellness-prevention/mask-resistance-during-a-pandemic-isnt-new-1918-many-americans-were-slackers [https://perma.cc/6XCLFQ3N].
60. See id.
61. See DAVID BLANKE, THE 1910S 11–12 (2002).
62. See PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT
(2013) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONS OF INJUSTICE]; Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P.
Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940
(2010) [hereinafter The Disutility of Injustice].
63. “In contrast to between-subjects designs, where two or more groups of
individuals each participate in a different treatment condition, in a within-subjects
design each individual participates in all treatment conditions.” Within-Subjects Design WEBCOURSES@UCF, https://webcourses.ucf.edu/courses/950845/pages/
within-subjects-designs (last accessed Apr. 6, 2022).
64. See INSTITUTIONS OF INJUSTICE, supra note 62; The Disutility of Injustice, supra
note 62.
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A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different
levels of disillusionment to three different groups and then testing their
levels of deference, compliance, and internalization.65 The results confirm the conclusions of the earlier within-subjects design: the greater the
disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance, and internalization. A third study analyzing responses in pre-existing large datasets
came to a similar conclusion using regression analysis.66 Studies by other
researchers have confirmed this relationship between criminal law’s moral
credibility with the community and its influence on the community’s behavior. As one writer concludes, “Overall, participants appeared less likely
to give the law the benefit of any doubt after reading cases where the law
was at odds with their intuitions.”67
The studies show that people’s judgments about justice are highly
nuanced, and even minor shifts in criminal law’s moral credibility produce
correspondingly minor shifts in community deference to it.68 This is a
particularly important finding because it means that no matter the current
state of a criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community,
any incremental reduction in credibility can produce an incremental reduction in deference—and any increase can produce an increase in
deference.
A wide variety of other kinds of studies support similar findings. For
example, a 2002 study on the flouting thesis—the idea that the perceived
justice of one law can influence compliance with unrelated laws—found
that rules regarded as unjust have “subtle but pervasive influences on a
person’s deference to the law . . . .”69 A 2003 study on the reasons why
taxpayers obey, rather than simply evade, taxes found that trust in the legal system had a strong effect on compliance.70 A 2008 study of Swedish
alcohol consumption found that there was a correlation between low insti-

65. See id.
66. See id.; see also Experimental Design, ENCYC. BRITTANICA https://
www.britannica.com/science/statistics/Experimental-design#ref367485 [https://
perma.cc/8LAM-9Q5G] (last accessed Apr. 6, 2022) (“Regression analysis involves
identifying the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. A model of the relationship is hypothesized and estimates of the
parameter values are used to develop an estimated regression equation. Various
tests are then employed to determine if the model is satisfactory. If the model is
deemed satisfactory, the estimated regression equation can be used to predict the
value of the dependent variable given values for the independent variables.”).
67. Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Between Legal Codes and Lay
Intuitions on Respect for the Law (June 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University).
68. See The Disutility of Injustice, supra note 62; In Defense of Moral Credibility,
supra note 52.
69. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005).
70. Benno Torgler, Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behavior and Trust, 14 CONST.
POL. ECON. 119 (2003).
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tutional trust and illegal alcohol consumption.71 And a 2009 study using
survey data from a number of African countries to model the relationship
between institutional trustworthiness and deference found that “the more
trustworthy and fair the government, the more likely its population will
develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to accept the government’s
right to make people obey its laws and regulations.”72
As these examples show, doing injustice or failing to do justice—punishing people significantly more or less than the community believes they
deserve—creates the conditions for further criminality. Where the community comes to believe that the justice system is unjust, they will become
less willing to defer, acquiesce, and comply with the criminal law’s commands and to internalize its norms.
C. The Problem of Complete Individualization
While strict adherence to an objective standard can lead to unjust
results that threaten both retributive and utilitarian goals, over-individualization can be equally problematic. First, an overly individualized standard
rests on a determinist account of human action to which the rest of the
criminal law does not adhere. A purely subjective account can only be
claimed to be exculpatory if one sees an individual’s actions as inescapably
determined by the person’s beliefs and dispositions that constitute her
character.73
Consider for example the Colorado Supreme Court’s endorsement of
the over-individualized standard in a self-defense case from the 1960s.
There, the judges held, “The right of self-defense is a natural right and is
based on the natural law of self-preservation. Being so, it is resorted to
instinctively in the animal kingdom by those creatures not endowed with
intellect and reason, so it is not based on the ‘reasonable man’ concept.”74
Under this perspective, the offender is seen as unable to have acted in any
other way. Regardless of how unreasonable the person’s conduct might
seem to the average person, the overly individualized standard would excuse any act that the defendant predictably committed given his or her
character and beliefs.75 In the case of self-defense, for example, such a
71. Johanna Ahnquist, Martin Lindström & Sarah P. Wamala, Institutional
Trust and Alcohol Consumption in Sweden: The Swedish National Public Health Survey
2006, 8 BMC PUB. HEALTH 283 (2008).
72. Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks & Tom Tyler, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 367 (2009).
73. See Sir W. David Ross, Indeterminacy and Indeterminism, reprinted in FREEDOM
AND RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 450, 454 (Herbert Morris
ed., 1961).
74. Vigil v. People, 353 P.2d 82, 85 (Colo. 1960).
75. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 58 (1998).
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standard would focus solely on whether the actor “did honestly believe
[that] it [was] necessary to use force in his own defense.”76
The rest of the criminal law does not operate on these terms, however. People are presumed to have the capacity to guide their conduct
according to rational choices. As Stephen Morse writes, “The law properly
treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as mechanical
forces of nature . . . . Otherwise, law and morality as action-guiding normative systems of rules would be useless, and perhaps incoherent.”77 A
person’s beliefs, desires, and dispositions certainly play a role in his or her
conduct, but they are not the sole causes of a person’s conduct. Rather,
criminal liability is founded on the notion that individuals are able to control the causal influence of some of their characteristics, and that despite
immense internal pressures telling them to behave in a certain way, they
are often able to choose to act otherwise.
Beyond the philosophic inconsistencies of an over-individualized standard, the fully-individualized standard is as out of touch with the community’s intuitions of justice as is the fully -objective standard. Rather than
over-punishing offenders who appear largely blameless, as the strictly objective standard does, a purely subjective standard risks under-punishing
offenders who the community believes are blameworthy but who, as a result of their personal characteristics and honest beliefs, are let off the
hook for their offense.
Consider for example the famous case of the “subway vigilante” Bernhard Goetz.78 Goetz, a white man, lived in New York City in the 1980s and
was mugged twice.79 Fearing for his life, Goetz purchased a handgun and
began carrying it with him, despite having no permit.80 One afternoon,
while riding on the subway, Goetz was approached by a group of four
young black men, one of whom asked Goetz how he was doing. Goetz
understood the question as the prelude to a mugging.81 The young men
had three sharpened screwdrivers but did not openly display them.82
When one asked Goetz for money, Goetz pulled his gun and began shoot76. Moor v. Licciardello, 463 A.2d 268, 272 (Del. 1983) (quoting STATE OF
DEL., GOVERNOR’S COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, DELAWARE CRIMINAL
COURT WITH COMMENTARY 117–18 (1973).
77. Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (2008).
78. People v. Goetz, 502 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
79. See Bruce Weber, James Ramseur, Wounded in ’84 Subway Shooting, Dies at 45,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/nyregion/
james-ramseur-victim-of-bernhard-goetz-subway-shooting-dies-at-45.html [https://
perma.cc/HPP9-HS5R].
80. Bob Kappstatter, The Story of Bernhard Goetz, the Subway Vigilante, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/story-bernhardgoetz-subway-vigilante-article-1.815968 [https://perma.cc/HPP9-HS5R].
81. See Michael Brooks, Stories and Verdicts: Bernhard Goetz and New York in Crisis, 25 COLL. LITERATURE 77, 78 (1998).
82. Id. at 86.
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ing as the young men scattered.83 Finding one, Darrell Cabey, sprawled
on a seat uninjured, Goetz said, “You don’t look so bad, here’s another,”
and shot at him again, leaving him permanently paralyzed.84 Goetz argued that he shot in self-defense, believing that he faced impending physical harm if he did not comply with their demands for money.85 While this
might have been a plausible claim with regard to the initial shooting, it
hardly seems plausible with regard to his subsequent shooting of Cabey,
who no longer presented a threat to him.86
Goetz was indicted by a grand jury, but the trial court overruled the
indictment on the belief that the prosecution erred in instructing the
grand jury that the test for self-defense was whether the defendant’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in the defendant’s position.87 Instead,
the court argued, the proper standard was purely subjective in that reasonableness was to be determined exclusively from the perspective of the defendant’s individual beliefs.88 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal,
explaining that a better jury instruction would have asked the jury to base
their decision on “what this defendant himself, subjectively, had reason to
believe—not what some other person might reasonably believe[,]” considering how all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter “appeared
to this defendant.”89 After Goetz was later successfully indicted and prosecuted, the Court of Appeals of New York subsequently disavowed the
purely subjective view, writing instead that “[s]uch an interpretation defies
the ordinary meaning and significance of the term ‘reasonably[.]’ ”90
A variety of bizarre beliefs and conditions that transcend legitimate
notions of blamelessness or mitigation have been claimed by defendants,
sometimes successfully, and under a purely subjective view these were all
have to be taken as a serious basis for adjusting the standard of conduct.
One man, for example, obtained a mitigation from murder to manslaughter after claiming that his wife’s constant ridiculing of him, including making him sleep on the floor, drove him to beat her to death with a
wrench.91 Elsewhere, a woman obtained an acquittal on drunk driving
charges after claiming that hormonal changes caused by pre-menstrual
83. Id. at 78.
84. Marcia Chambers, Goetz Spoke to One Youth, Then Shot Again, Police Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/28/nyregion/goetzspoke-to-one-youth-then-shot-again-police-say.html [https://perma.cc/QH6CNDKY] (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 4 (1988).
86. See id. at 26.
87. People v. Goetz, 502 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
88. Id. at 581.
89. People v. Goetz, 501 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (App. Div. 1986) (emphasis
added).
90. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 48 (N.Y. 1986).
91. See Margot Slade, At the Bar; In a Growing Number of Cases, Defendants Are
Portraying Themselves as the Victims, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20.
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syndrome drove her to commit disruptive and reckless acts.92 A teenager
who murdered an eighty-two-year-old woman claimed a mitigation for “television intoxication” that he said brainwashed him into becoming more
violent.93 And a man charged with rape argued that he was so influenced
by the 1939 film Gone With the Wind that he fully believed that sex should
be spontaneous, and that a woman who resists at first will eventually willingly give in if pushed hard enough.94
Under a completely subjective standard, these claims and the countless other questionable individualizing claims that have been raised in real
cases might well be granted. But mitigation in such cases with which the
vast majority of the public would likely not sympathize undermines both
retributive and utilitarian goals of punishment.
Principles of desert require defendants to make efforts to resist lawbreaking even if they have impulses toward criminality that are not experienced by the average person.95 The criminal law is premised on actionguiding principles wherein people are understood to be capable of moderating their own behavior in order to remain on the side of lawfulness.96
It is the people who make little to no effort at self-control, or who consciously disregard the rules of conduct, that appear most blameworthy and
deserving of punishment.97 In that sense, claims of mitigation or excuse,
which rely on personal biases—such as racism, homophobia, or misogyny—or which rely on bizarre phobias, pseudoscientific medical conditions, or media consumption serve only to diminish and mock the
important role that individualization can play in cases like the intellectually disabled statutory rapist, described above, or the woman who kills her
violent husband after he has abused her for years.
It is important to note, however, that hateful beliefs, on the one hand,
and phobias or quasi-pathological idiosyncrasies, on the other, are not to
be regarded equivalently. While rejection of the former is based on a nor92. See Martin Kasindorf, Allowing Hormones to Take the Rap; Does the PMS Defense Help or Hinder Women?, NEWSDAY (Suffolk, N.Y.), June 16, 1991, at 17.
93. See Tom Shales, Zamora is Guilty, But What About TV?, WASH. POST, (Oct. 9,
1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1977/10/09/zamorais-guilty-but-what-about-tv/3e295cd4-1b8e-4513-a558-1ecef73816c6/ [https://
perma.cc/SW5N-FMTR].
94. See Irene Lacher, The Rape Debate: Is There an Epidemic of Sexual Assaults? Or
Just a Wave of Politicized Hysteria? From Bedroom to Courtroom, The Rules are Changing,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-10-17vw-46750-story.html [https://perma.cc/7FEG-3DDL]; Tom Kuntz, Word for Word. A
Scholarly Debate; Rhett and Scarlett: Rough Sex or Rape? Feminists Give a Damn, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 19, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/weekinreview/
word-for-worda-scholarly-debate-rhett-scarlett-rough-sex-rape-feminists-give.html
[https://perma.cc/VA6B-WAXK].
95. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY
CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 50 (2006).
96. See HART, supra note 35, at 89.
97. See Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 L. & PHIL. 229
(2007).
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mative claim, asserting that the most insidious, loathsome views should
never provide a basis for exculpation or mitigation for fear that such
might be taken as approving or accepting the beliefs, the latter is an observation that absurd beliefs and pseudo-medical conditions should not be
taken into account because they have insufficient effect in reducing
blameworthiness. The larger point here is that a purely subjective standard would include all of these cases—both the hateful and the ridiculous—within its ambit, considering them on equal grounds, and ought to
be rejected.
D. The Scope of the Problem: Rules of Conduct Versus Principles of
Adjudication
How broad is the challenge of resolving the fundamental tension in
criminal law between reliance upon an objective or subjective standard? Is
the project so overwhelming in scope that it is beyond practical resolution? One important distinction among criminal law doctrines dramatically reduces the size of the problem and makes its resolution considerably
more feasible.
Criminal law has two distinct functions: providing ex ante rules of conduct and setting out ex post principles of adjudication.98 And each criminal law rule, or piece of a rule, serves either one function or the other.

98. See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 120–31 (1987) (describing rules of conduct as antecedent
to principles of adjudication); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, Problem No. 1
155–58 (1958) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (distinguishing
rules, standards, policies, and principles as being according to their purposive content); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
586–96 (1992) (explaining that “rules typically are more costly than standards to
create, whereas standards tend to be more costly for individuals to interpret when
deciding how to act and for an adjudicator to apply to past conduct”); ROSCOE
POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115–23 (1922) (explaining
that rules are “definite, detailed provisions for definite, detailed states of fact” and
principles are “made use of to supply new rules, to interpret old ones, to meet new
situations, to measure the scope and application of rules and standards and to
reconcile them when they conflict or overlap”); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967) (“The difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in
the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all or nothing
fashion . . . .”); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of
Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482–87 (1933) (defining rules as “precepts attaching a
definite detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed factual situation” and
principles as “authoritative points of departure for legal reasoning, employed continually and legitimately where cases are not covered or are not fully or obviously
covered by rules in the narrower sense”).
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One could pull these two kinds of roles apart to create a separate code of
conduct and a code of adjudication.99
The rules of conduct define offenses in terms of objective conduct and
circumstance elements. They describe not only what conduct is prohibited, but also what conduct is required.100 They also describe, in the context of justification defenses, when a person is permitted to engage in
conduct that is otherwise prohibited.101 Killing another is normally a violation of the rules of conduct, but doing so when is necessary to defend
against an unlawful aggressor is not a violation of the conduct rules. The
principles of adjudication, in contrast, set out the minimum culpability requirements for offenses liability, as well as provide doctrines of excuse that
offer a defense even if all offense requirements are satisfied.102 The
graphic below provides a simplified illustration of how these doctrines
interrelate.
RULES OF CONTACT
Prohibited
conduct and
affirmative
duties
(contained in
defense
definitions)

Objective
requirements of
justification
defenses (i.e.,
circumstances
justifying
conduct that is
otherwise
prohibited)

PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION
Culpability
requirements

Excuse defenses

Rules of conduct and principles of adjudication differ in their aims.
While rules of conduct strive to be clearly understood and easily recalled
by the public, principles of adjudication are often complex and nuanced
99. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 136–40
(1997) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW]. Indeed, this is an
exercise that has already been done. See Paul H. Robinson, Structuring Criminal
Codes to Perform Their Function, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2000); Paul H. Robinson,
Peter D. Greene & Natasha R. Goldstein, Making Criminal Codes Functional: A Code
of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304–65 (1996).
100. See Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, supra note 31, at 732.
101. See id. at 736.
102. The graphic below is reproduced from STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 98, at 141.
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in order to accurately capture the public’s intuitions of justice.103 This
difference suggests that these two aspects of a criminal code press for different kinds of formulations: one is blunt and clear-cut, while the other is
necessarily filled with variables and subjectivity.104
The distinction between the ex ante rules of conduct and the ex post
principles of adjudication is important for our present inquiry regarding
individualization factors because, it must now be clear, the individualization problem exists only with regard to the latter group of doctrines, doctrines of ex post adjudication. These criminal law rules, embodied in
offense culpability requirements, formal offense mitigations, and complete excuse defenses, represent only a subset of criminal code provisions,
which makes the scope of the individualization problem more limited and
focused than it would otherwise be.
II. CURRENT LAW’S ATTEMPTS TO DEAL
PROBLEM

WITH THE

INDIVIDUALIZATION

How does current criminal law handle the tension between an objective and a fully-individualized standard that arises in principles of adjudication: culpability requirements, statutory mitigations, and excuse defenses?
Unfortunately, its record is at best mixed. In many if not most jurisdictions, the law adopts a purely objective standard in a wide variety of doctrines, ignoring even powerful individualization factors that significantly
reduce the offender’s blameworthiness, as illustrated in Section II.A below. Some jurisdictions do attempt to partially individualize the objective
standard, at least with regards to some adjudication doctrines, as illustrated in Section II.B. This partial individualization frequently avoids what
would otherwise be potentially serious injustice, but unfortunately the partial-individualization effort is incomplete and ad hoc. The need for more
complete guidance on the issue of individualization is illustrated by Section II.C, which gives examples of individualizations that should probably
be universally excluded from consideration, such as racism and
homophobia, even though defense counsel might well be able to argue
that they played a significant role in bringing about the offense and arguably should be seen as reducing the actor’s blameworthiness. The most
obvious conclusion from this review of current law’s treatment of individualization factors is its serious inconsistency and unpredictability, both
among different jurisdictions and within a single jurisdiction, demonstrating the criminal law’s lack of guidance on how individualization factors
should be dealt with.

103. See Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, supra note 31, at 732.
104. See id.
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A. Objective Limitations on Adjudication Doctrines
Outlined below are five cases in which offenders were tried and convicted under an objective standard despite their efforts to introduce individualizing factors that could have significantly reduced the judgment of
their blameworthiness. The cases span a variety of criminal law doctrines
in which the notion of the objective “reasonable person” has been invoked, including negligence, provocation, and mistaken self-defense.
Each case results in an unsatisfactory outcome in which a defendant is
punished without regard for their personal circumstances and psycho-social history. Not only do these cases fail to provide just deserts, but they
diminish the moral credibility of the justice system by holding offenders to
standards they cannot meet.
Negligence. Walter Williams and his wife Bernice Williams are both
members of the Shoshone Native American tribe and neither are formally
educated.105 The couple’s seventeen-month-old son cries constantly, has
swelling in his cheeks, runs a high fever, and has an odor coming from his
mouth.106 The Williamses discuss taking their son to the doctor but decide to wait, giving him aspirin in the interim.107 They are wary of seeking
medical care because it is common for Child Protective Services to separate Native American children from their families and put them into foster
homes with non-Native American parents.108 Eleven days after he first
showed symptoms, the child dies.109 His autopsy reveals that an abscessed
tooth developed into a gangrenous infection, which would have been preventable had the parents sought medical care.110 The Williamses are
charged with manslaughter for negligently failing to provide proper medical care for their son.111
The trial court finds the couple guilty.112 On appeal, the couple argues that they did not willfully fail to provide necessary medical attention.113 The appellate court, however, offers only an objective standard of
negligence, explaining that negligence “describes a failure to exercise the
‘ordinary caution,’ ” where ordinary caution is “the kind of caution that a
man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar
conditions.”114 The notion of “reasonable prudence” is narrowly construed, allowing no space to take into account the Williams’ education,
105. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1169–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
106. Id. at 1170.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Families, in
THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 1–11 (Steven Unger ed., 1977).
109. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1170.
110. Id. at 1173.
111. Id. at 1169.
112. See id. at 1170–72 (explaining that the defendants “had no excuse that
the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor”).
113. Id. at 1170–71.
114. Id. at 1171.
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cultural upbringing, or reasons to distrust Child Protective Services.115 As
the court explains, “If . . . the conduct of a defendant, regardless of his
ignorance, good intentions and good faith, fails to measure up to the conduct required of a man of reasonable prudence, he is guilty of . . . negligence . . . .’ ”116 Though the Williamses had only the best of intentions, as
they loved their child dearly, the Washington Court of Appeals upholds
the conviction for manslaughter.117
The case of Raymond Garnett, described above,118 provides another
example of a defendant whose lack of sophistication raises doubts about
the propriety of the criminal liability imposed. Recall that Garnett has an
intellectual disability that leaves him often confused and struggling to
comprehend social cues.119 At age twenty, he is introduced to a thirteenyear-old girl who, along with her friends, tells Garnett she is sixteen.120
Garnett is cognitively similar to someone her age. The girl helps Garnett
sneak into her bedroom and the two spend the night talking, which eventually leads to intercourse.121 For both, it is their first time. Nine months
after the encounter, the girl gives birth to a baby, and Garnett is arrested
and convicted of statutory rape.122
Imagine that Garnett had lived in New Mexico,123 Alaska,124 or California,125 where courts have adopted the view, based either on legislation
or judicial decision, that a reasonable mistake of age can be introduced as
a defense to statutory rape. Using a purely objective standard, these states
ask how the defendant’s conduct compares to that of a reasonable person.
Court in Alaska, for example, provide the defense where the mistake is not
negligent—that is, where the actor does not perceive a risk that their sexual partner is underage, and the failure to perceive such risk is not a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.126 But Garnett, with his cognitive disabilities,
does not perceive the risk of an underage partner that an objective, reasonable person would have perceived. Despite the fact that Garnett could
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT
CHALLENGED THE LAW 142 (1999). The couple is sentenced to three years imprisonment, with their sentences suspended. Id.
118. See supra Section I.B.
119. Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d, 797, 798 (Md. 1993).
120. Id. at 799.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990).
124. See, e.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 840 (Alaska 1978).
125. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964).
126. See Guest, 583 P.2d at 840.

298

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 273

not meet the reasonable person standard, he would be held liable for a
negligent mistake as to age in these jurisdictions.127
Provocation. Like negligence doctrine, provocation cases commonly
rely upon an objective standard. Consider, for example, the case of John
Gounagias, a recent immigrant from Greece living in a small, tightly-knit
Greek community in Washington.128 One night Gounagias’ roommate
notices Gounagias in a drunken state and, as Gounagias lies helpless, the
roommate sodomizes him.129 The next day, the roommate brags openly
about his humiliation of Gounagias.130 Everywhere Gounagias goes, he is
tormented by the suggestive gestures and crude remarks.131 Humiliated
and having severe headaches, Gounagias’ frustration builds.132 Three
weeks after the incident, after one particularly cruel bout of public humiliation at the local coffeeshop, Gounagias storms out to find the man who
raped him and shoots him while he is sleeping.133 Gounagias is charged
with murder.134
At trial, Gounagias argues that he was provoked by the assault and the
repeated taunts, which caused him to become “sick” and “enraged.”135
The court applies a fixed rule that too much time has passed between the
sexual assault and his homicidal response136 and accordingly holds
Gounagias to an objective standard, which provides that provocation can
only be a mitigation where it has a “reasonable tendency to produce sud127. Of course, a majority of jurisdictions impose strict liability for mistake as
to age in statutory rape, thereby foreclosing any possibility of any defendant receiving a mistake defense:
[T]he majority of courts that have considered this issue continue to reject
the reasonable mistake of a victim’s age as a defense to statutory-rape and
maintain their allegiance to the common law. We note that our research
involving statutory-rape cases has revealed that the highest appellate
courts of only four states have judicially recognized the mistake of fact
defense.
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 763 (R.I. 1998) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted);
see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age
as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R. 5th 499 (1997); 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 25:19 (16th ed. 2021) (“In most jurisdictions, it is no defense that the defendant
did not know the victim’s age or reasonably believed the victim to be of the age of
consent.); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 77 (2021) (“Generally . . . the defendant’s knowledge of the age of the female is not an essential element of the crime of statutory
rape, and therefore, it is no defense that the accused reasonably believed that the
prosecutrix was of the age of consent.”).
128. State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 10 (Wash. 1915).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10–11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14 (explaining that “a cumulative result of repeated reminders of a
single act of provocation occurring weeks before . . . . had no tendency to prove
sudden anger and resentment”).
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den and uncontrollable anger . . . in the ordinary man.”137 Excluding
from the trial evidence that Gounagias’ post-rape life had been turned
into a series of jeers and humiliations from his only acquaintances in the
United States, the court convicts him of first-degree murder and sentences
him to life in prison.138
Mistaken Self-Defense. Perhaps more than any other criminal law doctrine, mistaken self-defense cases allow courts to affect significant injustice
where they hold a marginalized defendant to an objective standard that
fails to appreciate the complexities and challenges of the offender’s personal situation and experiences. Consider, for example, the case of Vladimir Sotelo-Urena, a homeless man in California.139 When homeless
shelters are overcrowded, Sotelo-Urena commonly has no choice but to
sleep on the streets.140 One night, while sleeping in a park, Sotelo-Urena
is attacked by three men who stab him several times.141 He is traumatized
by the incident and begins to carry a kitchen knife with him for self-defense, increasingly afraid that someone will hurt him.142 A few weeks
later, Sotelo-Urena is once again forced to sleep on the streets, and he sets
up camp outside of a local public library. When a man from a nearby
homeless encampment who is high on methamphetamines approaches
him and asks if he has a cigarette in what Sotelo-Urena perceives as a
threatening, aggressive manner,143 Sotelo-Urena pulls out his knife and
warns the man to leave him alone.144 He sees the man reach into his
pocket and believing that the man is reaching for a weapon, Sotelo-Urena
stabs and kills him.145 He is charged with first-degree murder.146
At his trial, Sotelo-Urena tries to argue that he was acting in what he
honestly believed was self-defense, explaining that his previous violent encounter had primed him to see potential danger in many interactions.147
He attempts to submit expert testimony to the fact that “homeless individuals experience a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats of violence”
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 9, 15; see also Paul H. Robinson, A General Mitigation for DisturbanceDriven Crimes? Psychic State, Personal Choice, and Normative Inquiries, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP PENN L. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3007&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/78B9A2ZA].
139. People v. Sotelo-Urena, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 262 (Ct. App. 2016).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 263.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (“Defendant told Bloom to get away or he was ‘gonna send [him]
straight to hell.’ Bloom said, ‘oh really?’ and laughed like he wanted to hurt
[Sotelo-Urena].” (first alteration in original)).
145. Id. (“Defendant explained: ‘I wasn’t gonna wait for him to get stabbed.
Last time it happened is because I waited. And because ya know, I let, you know,
him get the best of me, you know, and I wasn’t gonna do that a second time.’’’)
146. Id. at 265.
147. Id. at 262.
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as a result of their higher rates of victimization.148 The trial court, however, holds that Sotelo-Urena’s experiences are irrelevant to the question
of self-defense.149 The issue was not whether Sotelo-Urena was homeless,
the court argues, but rather “what risk did he face that anybody would face
behind the library . . . at night?”150 In support of his decision to hold
Sotelo-Urena to the objective, reasonable person standard, the judge further explains, “Everyone is subject to the same risks. I don’t think it’s a
subject for expert opinion[.]”151 Sotelo-Urena is denied any mitigation or
excuse, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to twenty-six years
to life in prison.152
A similarly troubling case in which an objective standard excludes
consideration of personal experiences with violence when making a claim
of self-defense is that of Garland Hampton.153 He is raised in a violent,
impoverished home in a tough neighborhood in Milwaukee.154 From the
age of two, his home existence is sufficiently chaotic and dangerous that
Child Welfare Services begin monitoring the household.155 At age six,
Hampton witnesses his mother shoot another woman, and at nine years
old he sees his mother shoot and kill her boyfriend.156 Child Welfare Services moves Hampton to his grandmother’s home in the same neighborhood, but she is equally violent.157 His grandmother threatens to shoot
Hampton for the slightest mistake and beats him regularly.158 Hampton
spends most of his early childhood living in fear, believing that the slightest disagreement can turn fatal.159 At fifteen, he begins carrying a gun for
self-protection. One night, Hampton accuses his friend of stealing money
from him, and the two begin to argue. Hampton’s friend draws his gun
and begins waving it at Hampton, shouting at him. Fearing that the dispute will turn fatal, as have so many other altercations that he has exper148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 266.
151. Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 265; see also Paul Payne, Downtown Santa Rosa Killer Re-Sentenced to 12
Years, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/
news/downtown-santa-rosa-killer-re-sentenced-to-12-years/ [https://perma.cc/
N6Z2-3PPZ] (re-sentencing Sotelo-Urena to twelve years in prison when, on remand from the California Court of Appeals, a jury found that Sotelo-Urena acted
in imperfect self-defense).
153. State v. Hampton, 558 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 887; see Don Terry, One Family’s Cursed Heirloom: Homicide, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/12/us/one-family-scursed-heirloom-homicide.html [https://perma.cc/L5RE-94PH].
155. See Don Terry, One Family’s Cursed Heirloom: Homicide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
12, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/12/us/one-family-s-cursed-heirloom-homicide.html [https://perma.cc/L5RE-94PH].
156. Hampton, 558 N.W.2d at 887.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 887.
159. Id. at 887–88.
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ienced, Hampton draws his own gun and shoots his friend, killing him.160
Hampton is charged with first-degree murder and waived into adult
court.161
Hampton tries to argue that he was acting out of an honest belief in
the need for self-defense, as one could reasonably expect given his
“psycho-social history[.]”162 The court holds such evidence legally irrelevant and inadmissible.163 Instead, the court instructs the jury that the reasonableness of Hampton’s beliefs should be judged according to the
standard of a “person of ordinary intelligence and prudence under all the
circumstances existing at the time of the offense[.]”164 Upon that instruction, the jury finds Hampton guilty of first-degree murder, and he is sentenced to life in prison.165
As the cases of Walter and Bernice Williams, Raymond Garnett, John
Gounagias, Vladimir Sotelo-Urena, and Garland Hampton show, where we
treat defendants with life-distorting backgrounds or limited capacities acting under trying circumstances as identical to an idealized reasonable person, we perpetuate injustice.
B. Partially Individualizing the Objective Limitations
While use of a purely objective standard can fail to provide just deserts in
a wide variety of doctrines, use of a partially-individualized standard can
avoid such injustice. Below, four cases spanning an array of self-defense
and duress scenarios demonstrate how a partially-individualized standard
can be essential to doing justice. Such a standard rejects what H.L.A. Hart
deemed the “sociologically very naı̈ve” conclusion that there is a “single
homogeneous social morality whose mouthpiece the judge can be in fixing sentence, and in admitting one thing and rejecting another as a mitigating or aggravating factor.”166 Rather, it takes the offender as she is,
with all of her diverse capacities, experiences, and beliefs, and asks what
she realistically could or could not have done in the particular circumstances with which she was presented.
160. Id. at 887.
161. See #100 Precious Lives: Breaking the Cycle of Violence, NPR MILWAUKEE (Dec.
13, 2016), https://www.wuwm.com/2016-12-13/100-precious-lives-breaking-the-cycle-of-violence [https://perma.cc/3SRY-4GRA].
162. Hampton, 558 N.W.2d at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 888.
164. Id. at 889.
165. Id. On appeal Hampton argues that the reasonable person standard
should be subjectivized so that the reasonable person would be “identical to the
actual defendant in terms of personal background and life experience.” Id. at 890.
The appeals court disagrees, explaining that this would “ ‘eviscerate the objective,
reasonable person requirement’ ” by making the “privilege of self-defense . . . vary
depending on the background or personal history of the person attempting to
exercise the privileges.” Id. Hampton’s conviction is upheld. Id. at 893.
166. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 171 (1968).
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Mistaken Self-Defense. Consider, for example, the case of Patrick Croy,
a Native American living on Shasta tribal territory in California.167 In this
part of California, negative stereotyping against Native Americans is widespread.168 As a child, Croy witnesses the local, white police force treat his
family and friends with enormous disrespect, taking men and boys into
custody for trivial infractions and beating them aggressively while they are
detained.169 By the time he is an adult, Croy not only distrusts the local
police, but is terrified of them.170 One night, when Croy is twenty-two, he
and his friends go to a nearby store.171 Croy’s friends get into a fight with
the store clerk, while Croy waits in the car.172 When the group leaves, the
store clerk points to Croy’s car and tells a nearby police officer to “[g]et
them[.]”173 Without asking further questions, the officer heads off in pursuit.174 Croy has no idea why the police are following his vehicle but believing that the police operate with relative impunity in their dealings with
the native community, he does not want to pull over and find out.175
Someone in Croy’s car fires a shot at the police car, and soon twenty-seven
police officers, all of whom are white, are tailing Croy’s car.176 The officers open fire, and Croy’s sister is hit by a bullet.177 At one point, later in
the melee, Croy gets out of the car and comes within feet of one of the
officers, and is shot in the back and arm. Croy responds by shooting the
officer in the chest, killing him.178
At trial, Croy is prevented from introducing evidence about the relationship between whites and Native Americans in the county where he was
raised.179 He is convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and assault with a deadly weapon, and is given
the death penalty.180 Croy appeals, arguing that he did not intentionally
seek to kill the police officer, but rather was acting in self-defense because
experience had shown him that white police officers tend to target Native
Americans.181 The California Supreme Court finds that evidence of such
167. People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985).
168. See David Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy: ‘True Believer’ Attorney Tony Serra
Fights His Own Version of the Indian Wars—in a Courtroom, L.A. TIMES (June 24,
1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-06-24-tm-1167-story.html
[https://perma.cc/34WZ-ZWSK].
169. See PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 248 (Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
170. See id. at 260.
171. Croy, 710 P.2d at 395.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 396.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 397.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See HARRIS, supra note 169, at 251.
180. See id. at 252.
181. See id. at 251.
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fear is relevant to Croy’s conduct.182 On remand, Croy’s lawyers are permitted to introduce evidence regarding the history of race relations between whites and Native Americans in the county.183 Jurors are invited to
put themselves in Croy’s shoes.184 A number of experts testify to the
ongoing discrimination that Native Americans face, thereby creating a
subjective framework within which the jurors could understand Croy’s
conduct.185 Finally, on direct examination Croy walks the jury through his
thought process leading up to the shooting, explaining, “I realized that all
the things my grandmother and father had told us were coming true, and
they were going to kill us all.”186 Drawing a connection between Croy and
the legacies of violence and mistrust that characterized relations between
whites and Native Americans in the county, the jury finds Croy not guilty
on all charges.187
For another example, consider the case of Janice Leidholm, a woman
living with her husband on a rural farm in North Dakota.188 Leidholm’s
husband is an alcoholic whose drinking binges frequently result in physical violence targeted at his wife.189 Leidholm is beaten to the point of
unconsciousness on more than one occasion.190 Over time, the abuse gets
so frequent that Leidholm feels compelled to find a way out.191 She suggests to her husband that they go to marriage counseling, but he refuses;
she calls the sheriff’s office and seeks information about entering a shelter, but she is unable to escape; finally, desperate, she tries unsuccessfully
to commit suicide.192 One night, Leidholm and her husband are driving
home when he tries to push her out of the car while it is moving at fortyfive miles per hour.193 Leidholm’s daughter saves her mother by pulling
her back into the car.194 Once home, Leidholm attempts to call the sheriff, but each time she dials the phone, her husband pushes her to the
ground.195 After fighting for hours, Leidholm’s husband falls asleep.196
Leidholm, believing that it is her only available means of saving herself,
182. Croy, 710 P.2d at 401.
183. See HARRIS, supra note 169, at 255.
184. See id. at 248.
185. See id. at 256.
186. Id. at 258.
187. See id. at 262.
188. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
189. Id. at 813.
190. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES
117 (5th ed. 2016).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 194; see also PATRICIA GAGNÉ, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE: THE
MOVEMENT FOR CLEMENCY & THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 52–53 (1998).
195. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983).
196. Id.
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grabs a kitchen knife and stabs her husband twice in the chest, killing
him.197 Leidholm is charged with first-degree murder.198
At trial, Leidholm argues that she acted upon an honest belief that
her conduct was necessary self-defense.199 North Dakota’s objective standard of self-defense holds that “if . . . a person has an actual and reasonable belief that force is necessary to protect himself against danger of
imminent unlawful harm, his conduct is justified . . . .”200 The court wavers on the issue of reasonable belief.201 Leidholm’s husband was asleep
when she stabbed him, so a fact-finder might reasonably discern that force
was not necessary to subdue him.202 Taking into account the extraordinary violence that Leidholm endured, the court determines that a partially
subjective standard should be employed.203 Under the partially-individualized standard, the court writes, the issue is “whether the circumstances
are sufficient to induce in the accused an honest and reasonable belief that
he must use force to defend himself against imminent harm.”204 The
court stresses the importance of understanding the situation from the
standpoint of a person with the mental and physical characteristics of the
defendant, who “sees what the accused sees and knows what the accused
knows.”205 As a result, Leidholm is permitted to introduce evidence of
battered spouse syndrome, and ultimately, her liability is reduced from
murder to manslaughter.206 To reject such a partially-individualization
standard would be to exclude as irrelevant the history of battering and the
resulting distorted reasoning that are at the core of Leidholm’s belief in
the necessity for her act.207
A final example is the case of James Law, a black man who in 1973
moves with his family to a predominantly white neighborhood in suburban
Maryland.208 Law is greeted hostilely by his new neighbors who disapprove of a black family living in the neighborhood.209 Within two weeks
of their move, Law’s home is broken into, and personal property taken.210
197. Id.
198. Id. at 813.
199. Id. at 818.
200. Id. at 816 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (1983)).
201. See id. at 818.
202. Id. at 816.
203. Id. at 817.
204. Id. at 820 n.8 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202,
1203 (Wash. App. 1982)).
205. Id. at 818.
206. See Kris H. Davick, Criminal Law—Self-Defense—Jury Instructions Given on
Subjective Standard of Reasonableness in Self-Defense Do Not Require a Specific Instruction
on Battered Woman Syndrome, 60 N.D. L. REV. 141, 142 (1984).
207. See B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to
Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 169,
190–91 (1991).
208. Law v. State, 318 A.2d 859, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
209. See id.
210. Id.
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Law begins to hear rumors that his family is being targeted by the Ku Klux
Klan, so he buys a shotgun.211 One week after the break-in, a sympathetic
neighbor sees a flickering light in the window of Law’s darkened house
and, suspecting another break-in, calls the police.212 When police arrive,
they creep around the house, checking for signs of forced entry.213 Law
wakes up and heads downstairs to investigate, gun in hand.214 Unable to
see the police officers outside, Law believes that once again racist intruders are trying to find a way into his home.215 At this point, the police
officers begin to inspect a door that was damaged in the previous break-in,
and Law becomes convinced that he is witnessing another break-in.216 He
sees one of the officer’s hands and notices that he is white.217 Law panics
and shoots blindly through the door, killing one of the officers.218 He is
charged and convicted of murder.219
Law appeals, arguing that evidence of the previous attack on his
home should be admitted in support of his belief that he was acting in selfdefense.220 After all, the police appeared poised to enter Law’s home in
the same way that the burglar had entered just a few weeks earlier, giving
Law good reason to believe that it was the same perpetrator.221 The court
explains that because Law honestly but unreasonably believed that he was
in danger of injury and the killing was the only way to prevent it, he might
be eligible for an imperfect self-defense.222 Law’s prior victimization suggests that he was not nearly as morally blameworthy as someone who vindictively shoots a police officer at point blank range.223 The seconddegree murder charge is reversed, and Law is held liable for manslaughter
and released on parole.224
Duress. The criminal law doctrine of duress also provides an opportunity for partial individualization in pursuit of more just outcomes. Consider, for example, the case of Lucila Ventura, who immigrates to the U.S.
from El Salvador at age twelve.225 Soon after she arrives, her father begins
211. Id. at 861, 871.
212. Id. at 861.
213. Id. at 862.
214. Id. at 861–62.
215. Id. at 862.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Law v. State, 349 A.2d 295 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
220. Law, 318 A.2d at 867.
221. Law, 349 A.2d at 299. The state even concedes in closing that Law “did
not knowingly shoot a police officer and that ‘he probably thought he shot a burglar or whatever that was outside.’ ” Id.
222. Law, 318 A.2d at 867–68.
223. Id. at 872
224. Id. at 873; see Appeals Reverses Conviction Twice, BALT. AFRO-AM., Jan. 3,
1976, at A11.
225. State v. L.V., 979 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
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to rape her regularly, and threatens that he will kill her mother if Ventura
tells anyone.226 Ventura has an intellectual disability, cannot speak English, and has no friends.227 At age fifteen, she becomes pregnant with
her father’s child.228 When she gives birth in the family’s apartment, her
father cuts the umbilical cord, grabs the baby, and throws it out of a bathroom window and into an air shaft.229 After the incident, Ventura’s father
begins to rape her more aggressively and painfully than before.230 At age
seventeen, Ventura becomes pregnant again, and once again, she gives
birth to a baby.231 Her father tells her to dispose of the baby, but Ventura
is reluctant.232 After many threats, she acquiesces and throws her baby
out of the window and into the air shaft.233 This time, though, the baby
survives the fall. An hour later the police arrive.234 Ventura is charged
with murder of her first child and attempted murder of her second.235
At trial, Ventura is prevented from introducing in support of her duress defense evidence related to her father’s abuse, and is convicted.236
On appeal, the court grants Ventura the opportunity to introduce more
individualizing evidence.237 There, an examination conducted by a state
psychiatrist is introduced, revealing that Ventura suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.238 “[T]here are severe circumstances that influenced her mental state at the time and likely impaired
her judgment, behavior and decision making ability,” the psychiatrist explains.239 A school psychologist from Ventura’s high school reports that
Ventura has a tested IQ of 57 and functions academically at a first-grade
level.240 Ventura’s probation officer also requests that the judge take into
226. See Jonathan Miller, Woman Admits She Threw Baby Down Air Shaft, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/nyregion/womanadmits-she-threw-baby-down-air-shaft.html [https://perma.cc/FE4D-8LLK].
227. See Melissa Rappaport, WNY Incest Mom Could Be Out of Jail in ‘Days’, HUDSON REP. (Oct. 18, 2009), https://archive.hudsonreporter.com/2009/10/18/wnyincest-mom-could-be-out-of-jail-in-days/ [https://perma.cc/6VKE-5R89].
228. See Michelangelo Conte, State Supreme Court Justice Upholds Release of Hudson Woman Who Threw Babies Down Air Shaft, NJ.COM (Jan. 19, 2019, 12:01 AM),
https://www.nj.com/hudson/2009/10/court_kos_prosecutors_bid_to_k.html
[https://perma.cc/ZU87-MSU8].
229. Miller, supra note 226.
230. L.V., 979 A.2d at 824.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Jonathan Miller, Family Saga, and Skeleton, Uncovered, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/nyregion/family-saga-and-skeletonuncovered.html [https://perma.cc/FYE8-Y5H8].
234. Id.
235. L.V., 979 A.2d at 825.
236. Id. at 832.
237. Id. at 835.
238. Id. at 824.
239. Id. at 827.
240. Id. at 826.
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account the substantial influence that Ventura’s father had over her.241
Ventura’s recent immigration, language barriers, forced isolation, and difficulty assimilating made her feel as though she did not have access to
medical, legal, or mental health services, her probation officer explains.242
The court ultimately reduces Ventura’s sentence to time served, given
what the court describes as the “horrific” circumstances that led to her
offense.243 A refusal to partially individualize the objective standard in
judging whether she could reasonably have been expected to have resisted
her father’s coercion would have resulted in a serious injustice.244
The cases of Patrick Croy, Janice Leidholm, James Law, and Lucila
Ventura cases make clear that where courts take a more holistic view of the
circumstances under which the defendant’s conduct occurred and the influences acting upon the defendant, they are better able to achieve a just
outcome.
C. Problematic Individualizations
While the objective standard should be partially individualized in
many cases in order to obtain liability that is proportionate to an actor’s
true blameworthiness, this is not to say that every individualizing factor
presented by a defendant should be taken into account. For example, a
standard in which racism, homophobia, sexism, or other hateful ideology
is seriously considered as a mitigating factor is likely to inspire public distrust of the criminal justice system. In the below cases, offenders invoke
troubling individualizing factors, such as cultural claims in support of conduct that would be seen as abhorrent in this country, in the context of selfdefense, provocation, negligence, extreme emotional disturbance, and
mistake as to justification.
The doctrine of provocation can provide examples of cases in which
defendants seek to individualize the reasonable person standard based on
idiosyncratic beliefs that the public might find reprehensible. Consider,
for example, the case of Dong Lu Chen, a middle-aged man who immigrates to the U.S. from China with his wife.245 Shortly after arriving, Chen
and his wife begin to experience difficulties in their marriage; Chen is
working in Maryland, while his wife is living in New York, and the distance
strains their relationship.246 When Chen returns to New York to visit, his
241. Id. at 834.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. Id. (“[W]e are satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise our original jurisdiction to resentence defendant because a remand will work an injustice by continuing her incarceration further.”).
245. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989), cited in Melissa Spatz, Note, A “Lesser” Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men who
Kill Their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597, 621–22 (1991).
246. See Marianne Yen, Refusal to Jail Immigrant Who Killed Wife Stirs Outrage,
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 1989), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
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wife refuses to have sex with him, and he becomes suspicious that she is
having an affair.247 When Chen tries to have sex with his wife on one
occasion, she refuses and tells him she prefers her other sexual partners
over him.248 Chen becomes dizzy and enraged; in his native culture, a
wife’s physical intimacy with other men signifies the downfall of her husband’s honor.249 Chen sincerely believes his wife’s infidelity will bring
shame to his entire genealogical tree—past, present, and future.250 Failing to act in such circumstances is to ensure that he is permanently outcast.251 Chen grabs a claw hammer and strikes his wife eight times in the
head, killing her.252 He then passes out.253 Chen is charged with seconddegree murder.254
In a bench trial, Chen’s lawyer argues that he acted involuntarily,
moved as he was by strong cultural pressures.255 To bolster this claim,
Chen’s lawyer produces an anthropology professor who explains Chen’s
conduct as if Chen had no choice but to kill his wife.256 “[I]n the Chinese
context, adultery by a woman was considered a kind of ‘stain’ upon the
man, indicating that he had lost ‘the most minimal standard of control’
over her,” the expert asserts.257 Chen is described as “a product of
China,” and as being “controlled by the ‘voice of [the Chinese] community.’ ”258 After considering all of the evidence, the judge agrees with the
defense, concluding that Chen’s culture “made him crack more easily”
and thus, he could be guilty only of reckless homicide, rather than murder.259 Chen is sentenced to five years of probation for an offense that,
had it been committed by someone else, might have carried a penalty of
twenty years to life in prison.260
1989/04/10/refusal-to-jail-immigrant-who-killed-wife-stirs-outrage/3f33ef6c-3ae7492a-bb88-31aa89b845ec/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4C-UW3J].
247. See Aahren R. DePalma, I Couldn’t Help Myself—My Culture Made Me Do It:
The Use of Cultural Evidence in the Heat of Passion Defense, 28 UCLA CHICANX-LATINX
L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
248. See Yen, supra note 246.
249. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Culture Cloaked in Mens Rea, 100 S. ATL.
Q. 981, 985 (2001).
250. See DePalma, supra note 247, at 7–8.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 7.
253. See Coleman, supra note 249, at 983.
254. See Celestine Bohlen, Holtzman May Appeal Probation for Immigrant in Wife’s
Slaying, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/05/nyregion/holtzman-may-appeal-probation-for-immigrant-in-wife-s-slaying.html [https:/
/perma.cc/4HGQ-RVY6].
255. See Coleman, supra note 249, at 985.
256. Id. at 985–86.
257. Id. at 986.
258. Id. at 986–87.
259. See id. at 984, 987.
260. See Yen, supra note 246.
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The doctrine of negligence also presents an opportunity for courts to
consider individualizing factors that the public might find offensive or unconvincing. Consider, for example, the case of Robert Strong, who was
born in Saudi Arabia to a devoutly Sufi family.261 Strong is a proponent of
a particular Sufi practice called “suspended animation,” which “intoxicates
the consciousness” and brings the practitioner closer to God.262 At
twenty-two, Strong moves to the U.S. where he declares himself to be the
leader of the Sudan Muslim Sect, an unrecognized spin-off of Sufism invented by Strong that has no correlate elsewhere in the world.263 To grow
his following, Strong frequently performs suspended animation ceremonies where he claims to stop a person’s heart and then stabs them with
knives without causing injury.264 He does this by tightly tying a cord
around a person’s arm, cutting off their circulation, and then stabbing
them in the arm below the tied cord so that little to no blood is lost. He
performs this ceremony safely dozens of times.265 One day, Strong tells
his congregants that he will perform the suspended animation ceremony
on a new initiate, and they gather to watch.266 Using ropes and ties,
Strong cuts off the circulation to his initiate’s arms and stabs him several
times. When he removes the knives, the man rapidly bleeds to death.267
Strong is convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to fifteen years in
prison.268
Strong appeals his conviction, arguing that considering his religious
beliefs, he should be liable at most for negligent homicide. According to
Strong, because he sincerely believed that the ceremony helped his followers attain a higher level of spiritual purity, he did not consciously disregard the risk of harm—as would be required of manslaughter—but rather,
he was unaware of the risk altogether.269 His religious beliefs, he claims,
made him sincerely believe that the ceremony was safe.270 Testimony is
introduced from some of Strong’s followers that the victim himself consented to the ceremony and perceived no risk.271 In a 6-1 holding, the
261. People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1975). Sufism is a mystical form
of Islam that encourages introspection, purification of the soul, and closeness with
God. See Megan Specia, Who Are Sufi Muslims and Why Do Some Extremists Hate
Them?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/
world/middleeast/sufi-muslim-explainer.html [https://perma.cc/84MC-NZTF] .
262. Vivek Raghuvanshi, Sufism—Antidote to Radical Islam, SSRN (Feb. 8,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2910835 [https://
perma.cc/C4KB-YFFM].
263. GEORGE W. JARECKE & NANCY K. PLANT, CONFOUNDED EXPECTATIONS: THE
LAW’S STRUGGLE WITH PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 114 (2000).
264. People v. Strong, 356 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (App. Div. 1974).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Cult Death Case Goes to Jury, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 12, 1972) at A7.
269. People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602, 604 (N.Y. 1975).
270. Id.
271. Id.

310

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 273

appellate court finds this testimony compelling and explains that Strong’s
“claimed lack of perception, together with the belief of the victim and
[the] defendant’s followers, if accepted by the jury, would justify a verdict
of guilty of criminally negligent homicide.”272 Responding to the dissent’s
argument that the holding overly individualizes the negligence standard
to cater to Strong’s idiosyncrasies, the majority explains that “the court
should look to other objective indications of a defendant’s state of mind to
corroborate . . . the defendant’s own subjective articulation.”273 The appellate court reverses and remands Strong’s earlier conviction, ruling that
the jury should have been instructed to consider the lesser charge of criminally negligent homicide rather than manslaughter.274 In an effort to
avoid another trial, Strong ultimately pleads guilty to attempted seconddegree manslaughter and serves just nine days in prison.275
Consider the case of Ethan Couch, a teenager from a suburb of Fort
Worth, Texas. Couch was raised by wealthy parents who frequently have
run-ins with law enforcement but buy their way out of serious punishment.276 They pass onto their son the belief that criminal activity is not a
big deal because it is always possible to pay the right people the right
amount of money to escape serious sanction.277 Having internalized this
value, Couch acts out frequently. He drops out of high school, uses drugs
frequently, and lives alone in a large house paid for by his parents.278 One
night, Couch has a party at which he and his friends drink alcohol excessively. Early in the morning, Couch decides to drive to a nearby convenience store and speeds, driving 70 mph on a dark, rural road where the
speed limit is 40 mph.279 Tragically, he strikes and kills four people who
are standing on the side of the road fixing a flat tire on their car.280
Couch has a blood alcohol level of 0.24, three times the legal limit in
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Keith Pritchard, Freedom in 9 Days for Admitted Slayer, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Jan. 20, 1976) at B6.
276. See Profile of Ethan Couch’s Parents, Who Attorneys Argued Spoiled Him, Made
Him Irresponsible, FOX 4 KANSAS CITY (Dec. 21, 2015), https://fox4kc.com/news/
profile-of-ethan-couchs-parents-who-attorneys-argued-spoiled-him-made-him-irresponsible/ [https://perma.cc/UY5B-FMVR]; Emily Schmall, ‘Affluenza’ Teen Grew
Up in Wealthy but Unstable Home, YORK DISPATCH (Dec. 31, 2015, 8:13 AM), https://
www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/local/community/2015/12/31/affluenzateen-grew-wealthy-unstable-home/78122424/ [https://perma.cc/8XF8-2R2D].
277. See Michael J. Mooney, The Worst Parents Ever, D MAG. (May 2015), https:/
/www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2015/may/affluenza-the-worstparents-ever-ethan-couch/ [https://perma.cc/YW2Q-7FXL].
278. See id.
279. See Tristan Hallman, Sheriff: Speed and Alcohol Played Roles in Chaotic Tarrant County Wreck that Killed Four, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jul. 9, 2013, 6:00 PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/07/09/sheriff-speed-and-alcoholplayed-roles-in-chaotic-tarrant-county-wreck-that-killed-four/ [https://perma.cc/
T9FZ-8B9D].
280. See id.
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Texas.281 He is charged with four counts of intoxication manslaughter
and two counts of intoxication assault, and the prosecution seeks the maximum sentence of twenty years.282
At trial, Couch’s lawyer introduces evidence of his wealth-saturated
upbringing to demonstrate that it is difficult for Couch to understand the
consequences of his actions.283 A psychologist for the defense claims that
he suffers from “affluenza,” a psychological condition in which excessive
privilege makes it difficult to judge the wrongfulness of conduct.284 Apparently moved by the teen’s alleged condition, the judge sentences
Couch to ten years of probation and orders him placed temporarily in a
rehabilitation facility.285 Widespread public outcry follows the lenient sentence for the culpable killing of four people.286 “The details of the crime,
and then the lack of justice in the sentence, outraged people in this area
in a way that I haven’t ever seen people outraged,” a local sheriff reported.287 Couch later violates his probation by drinking alcohol and fleeing to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.288
The doctrines of provoked “heat of passion” or the more modern “extreme emotional disturbance,” which mitigate an intentional killing to
281. See id.
282. See Caila Klass & Alexa Valiente, ‘Affluenza’ DUI Case: What Happened Night
of the Accident That Left 4 People Dead, ABC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://
abcnews.go.com/US/affluenza-dui-case-happened-night-accident-left-people/
story?id=34481444 [https://perma.cc/WY5V-KYY5].
283. See Manny Fernandez & John Schwartz, Teenager’s Sentence in Fatal
Drunken-Driving Case Stirs ‘Affluenza’ Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/us/teenagers-sentence-in-fatal-drunken-drivingcase-stirs-affluenza-debate.html [https://perma.cc/4L6X-S7V8].
284. See Michael Muskal, Texas Teen’s Probation for Killing 4 While Driving Drunk
Stirs Anger, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-texas-teen-drunk-driving-probation-affluenza-20131212-story.html
[permalink unavailable]; Michael Karson, The Affluenza Defense, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/feeling-our-way/
201602/the-affluenza-defense [https://perma.cc/R5J7-3NHX].
285. See Judge Again Orders No Jail for Teen in ‘Affluenza’ Case, AMARILLO GLOBENEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.amarillo.com/news/latest-news/2014-02-06/
judge-again-orders-no-jail-teen-affluenza-case [https://perma.cc/QY3W-448H]; Felicia Patinkin, Affluenza DUI Case: Prosecutors Try Again to Put Teen Behind Bars ABC
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2013), https://abcnews.go.com/US/affluenza-dui-case-prosecutors-put-teen-bars/story?id=21259169 [https://perma.cc/3AEZ-GCXL].
286. See Jessica Luther, Affluenza: The Latest Excuse for the Wealthy to Do Whatever
They Want, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/15/affluenza-texas-dui-ethan-couch [https://perma.cc/6FMZT3T8].
287. See Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & Azam Ahmed, Ethan Couch,
‘Affluenza’ Teenager, Had Last Party Before Fleeing, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/us/affluenza-ethan-couch-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/5752-CWE7].
288. Id. He was subsequently sentenced to two years in jail. Jason Hanna,
‘Affluenza’ Teen Ethan Couch Gets Tentative Order for 2-Year Jail Term, CNN (Apr. 14,
2016, 12:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/13/us/texas-affluenza-ethancouch/index.html [https://perma.cc/FM4Y-TGEX].
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manslaughter, also provide an opportunity for courts to apply troubling
individualizing characteristics to support an offender’s mitigation. Consider the case of Fumiko Kimura, a woman who immigrates to the U.S.
from Japan.289 Kimura meets her husband, who is also a Japanese immigrant and has two children. In keeping with the traditional family values
on which she was raised, Kimura spends all of her time at home with her
children.290 She has no close friends or hobbies, and she rarely leaves the
house.291 At age thirty-three, she receives a disturbing phone call from a
woman who tells Kimura that she has been having an affair with Kimura’s
husband for three years.292 Kimura blames herself and believes that if she
had been a better wife, her husband would not have cheated on her.293
She becomes depressed, and barely sleeps or eats. She starts to consider
the Japanese practice of Oyako-shinju, or parent-child suicide.294 Although not a widespread practice, Oyako-shinju is regarded as an honorable, although tragic, way of ridding a family of shame caused by
infidelity.295 Kimura takes her children to a deserted beach, carries them
into the ocean, and attempts to drown them along with herself.296 She is
spotted by two beachgoers who intervene.297 Kimura survives but her two
children die.298
Kimura is charged with murder and felony child endangerment.299
The serious charges are met with outrage from many in the Japanese community, and the district attorney’s office receives petitions containing
twenty-five-thousand signatures from people who urge a lenient sentence.300 The petition states that in Japan, Kimura would be charged with
289. Michele Wen Chen Wu, Comment, Culture Is No Defense for Infanticide, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 975, 994–95 (2003) (citing People v. Kimura, No.
A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1985)); Maura Dolan, Two Cultures Collide Over
Act of Despair: Mother Facing Charges in Ceremonial Drowning, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24,
1985), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-02-24-mn-24484-story.html
[https://perma.cc/P6RQ-J7AD].
290. See Leslie Pound, Mother’s Tragic Crime Exposes a Culture Gap, CHI. TRIB.
(June 10, 1985), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-06-108502060678-story.html [https://perma.cc/7QXS-MXC4].
291. See id.
292. See Rashmi Goel, Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in Cultural Defense, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 443, 445 (2004).
293. See id. at 445–46.
294. See Valerie L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the Misuse of Culture in
Criminal Law, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 526–27 (1996).
295. See id.
296. See Goel, supra note 292, at 443.
297. See LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, CHILD HOMICIDE: PARENTS
WHO KILL 142 (2007).
298. See id.
299. See October Trial for Mother Accused of Killing Children in Surf, AP NEWS
(Aug. 6, 1985), https://apnews.com/article/7cd6cf74bf15a78b8942b952d662ac51
[https://perma.cc/UWH6-ME4R].
300. ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 84 (2007); Woman
Whose Children Died in Suicide Attempt Living Quietly, AP NEWS (Apr. 6, 1986), https:/
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involuntary manslaughter at the most, “resulting in a light, suspended sentence, probation, and supervised rehabilitation.”301 Kimura’s lawyer argues that Kimura honestly believed that her children would be subjected
to extraordinary humiliation throughout their lives if she failed to act.302
Kimura’s behavior was “psychological in origin, but cultural in direction.
Culture shaped or directed her actions,” her lawyer explains.303 As a result, Kimura is found to be entitled to the heat of passion mitigation from
murder to voluntary manslaughter. The judge points to her established
ties to her native Japanese heritage.304 Though Kimura forcibly drowned
both of her children, she is sentenced to just a year in county jail, a verdict
that many in the community—including many Japanese Americans—find
far too lenient.305
One could conclude, then, that the state of current criminal law is
unsatisfactory in relation to this fundamental issue of the standard to use
in judging blameworthiness as it arises in adjudication doctrines. A wide
variety of doctrines are affected—culpability requirements, statutory mitigations, and excuse defenses—yet no satisfactory guiding rules seem to
exist. The use of a purely objective standard invites regular injustice. Attempts to partially individualize the objective standard may avoid some injustices in some cases, yet the law has no guiding rules by which such
partial-individualization judgments can be made in a given case. And
some individualizing factors, such as racism, homophobia, bad temperedness, or broad cultural differences, may be highly inappropriate to use
but, with no guiding rules, commonly may be given deference.
III. SOLVING

THE

PARTIAL-INDIVIDUALIZATION PUZZLE

While we can identify a series of cases in which individualization
seems inappropriate,306 and cases in which individualization seems appropriate or even necessary,307 what is needed is some mechanism to guide
the individualization judgment in the full range of cases in which the issue
can arise. Guidance in application requires addressing two distinct issues:
first, when should evidence of individualizing factors be admissible at trial
and, second, when such evidence is admitted, what guidance can be given
/apnews.com/article/d2d8d50c37dd2ceb7cce311551f328e5 [https://perma.cc/
Z3D9-S449].
301. Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101, 117 (1997) (quoting Spencer Sherman,
Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 5, 1985).
302. See id. at 117–18.
303. Id. at 119 (quoting Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1985).
304. See id. at 118.
305. See Pound, supra note 290 (explaining that a Santa Monica resident described Kimura’s conduct as “an unforgiveable act”).
306. See infra Section II.C.
307. See infra Sections II.A–B.
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to juries (or other decision-makers) on when and how such evidence
should be taken into account?
A. Admitting Individualization Evidence at Trial
Two sorts of individualization evidence seem clearly inappropriate to
be introduced at trial. First, unless the individualizing evidence concerns
a factor that had a significant role in bringing about the actor’s offense
conduct, it ought not be introduced to individualize jury judgments concerning culpability, mitigation, or excuse.308 To allow otherwise would be
to open the trial to a host of factors that have little or no relevance that
can improperly distract jurors from their legal duty. They ought not be
encouraged to base their judgment on whether they like or dislike the
defendant, for example, but rather to look only to matters relating to the
defendant’s commission of the offense and the reasons for it.309
A second kind of evidence that ought to be excluded is that of individualizing factors that, if taken into account to benefit a defendant,
would offend community norms by approving or at least accepting an attitude or point of view that the community believes ought to be actively
discredited. Obvious examples include racial animus, homophobia, gender bias, and other such beliefs and attitudes that the community would
find offensive as the basis for mitigation. Recall the several cases of this
sort discussed above in Section II.C, which describes problematic
individualizations.310
But aside from these two kinds of individualizing evidence, a commitment to the blameworthiness proportionality principle would call for a
jury or other decision-maker to understand as much as possible about the
defendant’s capacities and situation. Thus, any individualization evidence
not barred by one of these two exclusions—because it had no significant
effect in bringing about the offense conduct or because it would offend
community values if used as a basis for mitigation—ought to be admissible
to more accurately assess the culpability, mitigation, or excuse issues raised
by the facts of the case.
308. For example, while it may be appropriate to consider a person’s kleptomania where they have been charged with a series of larcenies, it would not be
appropriate to consider her kleptomania where they have been charged with sexual assault. Alternatively, it may be important to take into account that a person
was frequently beaten by their spouse if they kill their spouse, but not if they commit wire fraud or insider trading.
309. See U.S. CONST. amend VI; Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948);
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
310. Recall the cases from supra Section II.C: Dong Lu Chen, who killed his
adulterous wife to rid himself of cultural shame; Robert Strong, who killed a disciple of his religious sect in a religious ceremony; Ethan Couch, who killed four
people while driving drunk because of his alleged “affluenza”; and Fumiko
Kimura, who killed her two young children in a culturally-rooted parent-child suicide practice.
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Rules governing the introduction of individualization evidence at trial
will, of course, affect non-trial cases as well, for both prosecution and defense will include application of these rules in judging the strength of
their case and, thereby, the plea agreement they might be willing to accept. In other words, the individualization evidence admission rules will
affect many if not most cases, especially because it is this kind of evidence
that defense counsel are so commonly anxious to get before jurors.311
One can imagine a number of objections to the suggestion here that,
with the two exceptions noted, individualization evidence ought to be
more freely introduced at trial. One kind of objection might flow from a
concern that allowing the introduction of more individualizing factors
could significantly increase the length and complexity of trials, creating
congestion and backlogs. That is, parsing through a defendant’s personal
experiences and beliefs as well as the circumstances surrounding his crime
may be a time-consuming effort.
It might be true that allowing greater individualization might make
some trials longer, but this cannot be a major concern. Individualization
is not an issue unless some existing legal doctrine raised by the facts of the
case creates an issue, a culpability requirement, a formal mitigation doctrine, or an excuse defense. Further, even where such a legal issue exists
in the case, it can hardly have a significant effect on a system in which so
few cases go to trial.312 The main significant change in practice will be in
the kinds of facts that are seriously considered during plea discussions:
some individualizing factors that defense counsel may have offered in the
past, but for which there was only a murky legal basis for relevance, will
now be legally relevant. On the other hand, once one clarifies the cases in
which individualizing factors are relevant and how they are relevant—as
shown in the proposed provision below—the adjudication process will be
clarified and simplified. Indeed, many murky claims of individualizing factors offered by defense counsel will, with codified guiding rules, now become more clearly irrelevant to the disposition of the case.
A utilitarian theorist might argue that individualization evidence
should only be used where it increases deterrence or otherwise improves
the crime-control capacity of the criminal law. Such a theorist might worry
that allowing greater individualizations into evidence, even during plea
311. See Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence to
Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 235–37 (2004); Scott E.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and
Lay Testimony, 83 U. VA. L. REV. 1109, 1122–30 (1997).
312. Further, one need not look too far abroad to find ample evidence of
criminal justice systems allowing more individualizing evidence without experiencing significant inefficiencies in their ability to process cases. The French criminal
justice system, for example, has numerous provisions allowing for the introduction
of individualized evidence, yet it is one of the more efficient justice systems in
terms of caseload divided by resolved cases—a proxy for congestion—as well as in
terms of time to resolve a case. See Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the
World: A Comparative Perspective, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 87 (1999).
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negotiations, would increase crime because offenders might believe that
they could more easily escape punishment if they could invoke some sort
of individualization factor to minimize their conduct. A narrower use of
individualization might be more appealing to these utilitarians because it
might seem to make it harder for an actor to invade criminal liability, and
therefore provide greater deterrent effect.
This point is mistaken, however, for two reasons. First, the public typically would not be aware of such changes in the legal rules, particularly
when rules are primarily procedural, as in the determination of which evidence may be admitted at trial. In that sense, the idea that people might
commit more crimes because they learn that there is now a greater chance
that their individual characteristics might be taken more seriously seems
far-fetched. Second, while the public is typically unaware of the specific
rules that make up the criminal law, they are highly aware of cases in
which the criminal law appears to get it wrong and punishes someone noticeably more or less harshly than the public believes they deserve. As discussed above, ample empirical research has demonstrated that the public
has fairly clear, uniform ideas about the relative blameworthiness of defendants even when those defendants have complex backgrounds and the
offenses occur in complex circumstances. When the public learns of a
person being judged by the system as noticeably more or less blameworthy
than the community views, the public’s trust in the criminal justice system
marginally diminishes, which in turn marginally reduces the justice system’s crime-control effectiveness, as Section I.B previously discussed.
B. Guiding Jurors and Judges in the Use of Individualization Evidence
As the previous analyses of cases demonstrate, the individualization
issue can arise in two different sorts of adjudication doctrines. First, the
issue arises in cases of mistake where jurors are asked to judge whether an
actor’s mistake was reasonable or negligent or reckless. This can arise
whenever an offense definition requires proof of certain culpability elements or can arise in the context of general defenses such as mistake as to
justification, most commonly in cases of mistake as to self-defense. In a
second kind of case, the individualization issue can arise where an actor
has failed to control himself and jurors are asked to decide whether some
internal or external pressure or mental or emotional disturbance should
provide a mitigation or excuse. This commonly occurs in cases of duress,
provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, or involuntary intoxication.
Thus, the analytic guidance provided to jurors ought to speak to each of
these two kinds of cases: mistake cases and failure-to-control cases. Many
of the individualization issues will be analogous in the two settings but the
language one would use to provide guidance many differ.
In the mistake cases, the ultimate question is whether the jury could
have expected the actor to have avoided the mistake giving rise to liability.
For example, in judging whether a statutory rape defendant satisfies the

2022]

INDIVIDUALIZING JUSTICE JUDGMENTS

317

offense element of negligence—“he should [have been] aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that” his partner was underage313—the jury
should take into account the fact that the defendant had a low IQ and no
social experience. In failure-to-control cases, the ultimate question is different but analogous: could we have expected the actor, given their capacities and situation, to have resisted the influence of the factors pressing
them toward commission of the offense? For example, in judging in a
duress case whether “a person of reasonable firmness . . . would have been
unable to resist,”314 the jury ought to take into account the fact that the
actor was an inexperienced seventeen-year-old.
The analysis of the wide variety of individualizing factors that can be
offered as relevant in an equally wide variety of cases suggests that the
answer to the individualization puzzle is not to be found in identifying
particular factors that should be taken into account in all cases and others
that should not be taken into account in any cases. It appears that shared
intuitions of justice are too nuanced and complex for that. An individualizing factor might be important to take into account in some circumstances, but the same factor ought not be taken into account in other
circumstances. Further, an individualizing factor might be appropriate to
take into account in both of the two situations, but ought to be given enormous effect in judging one case but only marginal weight in judging another case.
In other words, the individualization puzzle does have an answer—
individualization is not a mysterious unknowable mess, an unsolvable
problem—but the answer to the individualization question is simply complex. Does that mean that guidance to decision-makers is not possible?
No. There is an enormous amount of useful guidance that can be provided, but it is guidance that acknowledges the complexity of the question
and therefore does not attempt to give decision-makers a fixed answer;
rather, it provides a decision process by which an answer can be reached
for the case at hand.
What does such guidance look like? First, as discussed immediately
above, one can exclude from admission at trial some factors altogether:
first, factors that did not have an effect relevant to the legal issues of culpability, mitigation, or excuse, and, second, factors that are barred for being
in serious conflict with community norms. All other individualizing factors relevant to judging the actor’s blameworthiness under doctrines of
culpability, mitigation, or excuse are admissible.
Of the individualizing factors that are admissible, the decision-maker
was asked to focus on a number of specific inquiries. First, what is the
strength of an individualizing factor’s influence in bringing about the actor’s
offense conduct or mistake. For example, what was the seriousness of the
threat, the severity of their fear, the power of cultural influence, etc.? The
313. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
314. Id. § 2.09(1).
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stronger the force of the factors’ influence, the less blameworthy the offender may be.
A second and distinct inquiry is the actor’s capacity to resist the factor’s
influence in bringing about the offense conduct or the mistake. This is not
the ultimate normative judgment about whether anyone could have expected the actor to have resisted the influence or avoided the mistake, but
rather the more factual assessment of the extent of the actor’s limited capacity to resist or avoid. Important here will be such things as an actor’s
limited mental capacity, youthfulness, social isolation, mental or emotional state distorting reasoning (as in instances of PTSD or Stockholm
syndrome), limited communication skills, etc. Any of these factors may
make it more difficult for an actor to resist the individualizing factor’s
influence in bringing about the conduct or the mistake. By taking into
account both of these kinds of facts—the strength of the factor’s influence
pushing toward the offense and the extent of an actor’s capacity to resist
such influence—the jury can form some sense of what could have been
expected of this actor in this situation.
A third key inquiry is the seriousness of the offense. The more serious the
offense, the greater the expectation that the actor should resist the influence of the individualizing factor and avoid the offense. The less serious
the offense, the more someone may be willing to understand how the
strength of the influencing factor and the limited capacity of the actor to
resist it could end up bringing about the offense conduct or the mistake.
These three factors, which call jurors’ special attention, focus strictly
on the situation as it exists at the time of the offense. However, other
important inquiries call for consideration of the events occurring before
the offense. Was the actor at fault in bringing about the individualizing factor or
its influence that the actor now asks the jury to take account of? It may be
relevant, for example, that the actor voluntarily joined a cult knowing
their indoctrination plans might lead him to commit the offense.
If not at fault in bringing about the individualizing factor or its influence, was the actor perhaps at fault for failing to take an opportunity to avoid
or escape the factor or its influence? For example, while the actor was born
into an existing cult, thus faultless for his initial membership, had he
reached an age and had sufficient opportunity in life experience that we
might have expected him to have left the cult or rejected its
indoctrination?
Finally, jurors ought to take into account the extent to which allowing
the factor to mitigate the offender’s liability might conflict with existing
community norms and values by seeming to approve or at least accept a
belief or set of values that the community seeks to condemn. In other
words, while particularly egregious cases of abhorrent beliefs or values
might be barred by the judge from admission at trial, even where that high
standard is not met and the individualization evidence is admitted, jurors
ought to include in their deliberations the same possibility that having the
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abhorrent beliefs or values contribute to a mitigation would be too costly
in undermining existing norms and values as well as the criminal justice
system’s moral credibility with the community.
To summarize, the individualization puzzle has eluded scholars for so
long in large part because, it turns out, other than the two exclusions from
consideration—factors that did not have a substantial effect in bringing
about the offense and factors the consideration of which would sufficiently
appall the community as to undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility—there do not exist specific factors that should be taken into account
and specific factors that should not. The same individualizing factor
might be appropriate to take into account in one case but not in another.
Nearly any (non-excluded) individualizing factor might theoretically be
appropriate to take into account, but each must be weighed according to
certain, specific aspects of the case: the strength of the factor’s influence
in bringing about the offense, the capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s
influence, the seriousness of the offense, the actor’s fault in having the
factor, and any conflict with existing community norms and values that
might flow from allowing the factor to mitigate or excuse.
One may be concerned that this approach opens too widely the possible individualizing factors that may be taken into account. The two bases
for complete exclusion—insufficient effect and appalling to the community—will do some screening, but this still leaves an enormous array of
factors that might be taken into account, making trials more burdensome
and less predictable, as noted previously. However, this concern is
overblown.
First and foremost, a true commitment to doing justice requires that
we consider all individualizing factors that can affect our judgment of the
offender’s degree of blameworthiness. To exclude a relevant individualizing factor is to sacrifice justice for expediency.
Second, the system proposed here, and detailed in the proposed statutory formulation below, is not one in which defense counsel are free to
run wild with any individualizing factor they can construct, using it to play
upon juror sympathies that have no relevance to the extent of the offender’s blameworthiness for the offense at hand. For example, claims
that a defendant has admirably recovered from addiction and successfully
started a small business with several employees might well give grounds for
admiring this aspect of the defendant’s life choices, but would be irrelevant to assessing the defendant’s blameworthiness for statutory rape and,
therefore, would be inadmissible even under the broader use of individualizing factors proposed here.
Further, the potential for defense counsel abuse of the proposal’s
more liberal introduction of individualizing factors is offset by the specific
guidance given to jurors about how and when they are to take individualizing factors into account, guidance that is missing from today’s practice
that either unjustly excludes relevant individualizing factors or allows
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broad judicial discretion to admit individualizing factors without guidance
to the jury. With the guidelines as to the relevant factors that ought to be
taken into account, an offender’s claim of past drug rehabilitation and
small business success would more clearly be seen as not relevant.
Nor can the proposal be criticized as asking too much of jurors because it calls for a sometimes complex and intuitive justice judgment
rather than application of a mechanistic rule. Current criminal law regularly calls upon jurors to make such justice judgments, as is evident in the
many doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse discussed in the
cases in Part II. For the insanity defense and the involuntary intoxication
defense, for example, jurors must decide whether the offender lacks “substantial capacity” to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the requirements of law.315 In a duress excuse,
jurors must determine whether the coercive threat is one that “a person of
reasonable firmness” would have given into.316 In the mitigation of murder to manslaughter, jurors must determine whether the killing was committed under the influence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”317 When recklessness is required as to an objective element of an offense, as is the common
default position,318 jurors must determine whether “disregard [of the risk]
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.”319 In other words, what we
ask jurors to do here is not substantially different from what we commonly
ask them to do in many doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse.
Finally, the proposal might be challenged for its apparent devaluation
of the sentencing process. After all, judges already make quasi-individualizing decisions when they reduce an offender’s sentence for a variety of
factors such as remorse or a particularly traumatic childhood. Why invite
the untrained intuitions of lay persons into the mix when skilled judges
may already be equipped to take up the individualization challenge?
First, to leave the individualization issue to be dealt with during sentencing process is to exclude it from the determination of criminal liability, where it frequently will have the effect of providing a complete defense
to the offense charged or reducing the grade of an offense. Failing to
make appropriate individualizing adjustments in determining the offense
of conviction cannot be fully compensated for through the sentencing
process.
Further, the proposal seeks to protect and promote jury involvement
as desirable and indeed necessary. Jurors have been shown to be the most
reliable representation of community views on such justice-focused issues
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2.08(4).
§ 2.09(1).
§ 210.3.
§ 2.02(3)(1)(b).
§ 2.02(2)(c).
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as individualization.320 Perhaps more importantly, it is reliance upon the
lay intuitions of justice of a jury, rather than the personal preferences of a
single sentencing judge, that will maximize the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community. Reliance upon individual judicial sentencing
discretion pushes such community justice judgments out of the frame and
invites dispositions that conflict with shared community judgments of
justice.
Finally, reliance upon judicial sentencing discretion is likely to produce unjustified disparity among sentencing judges, as each judge may
have his or her own personal views about proper individualization. The
last several decades of disparity studies and the resulting sentencing guideline movement support this point.321
If a jurisdiction insists on barring juries from the individualization decision, then it ought at very least to provide judges with the system of individualization guidance provided here. Rather than leaving it to a
spontaneous fit of compassion from the bench, the formulation provides
judges with a decision tree to guide the individualization decision and,
most importantly, that same decision tree will be the guidance for all other
judges in the jurisdiction. But even with such individualization guidance
provided to judges, jury involvement is to be preferred over strict judicial
determinations, for the reasons noted above.
C. A Proposed Statutory Individualization Provision
Perhaps the real test of whether the approach proposed here is practical is whether it can be codified into a workable statutory formulation.
The guidance in taking account of individualizing factors described above
might be codified in something like the following:
XXX. Individualizing Justice Judgments Called for by Culpability, Mitigation, or Excuse Doctrines
320. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching
the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1138–40 (2005).
321. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (permitting the sentencing court to depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines if it finds “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission”); D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT: THE
SEARCH FOR STRUCTURED DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, 1860-1910 68 (1979); Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58
STAN. L. REV. 309, 311–15 (2005); Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing
Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going,
How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 267
(2013); James A. McLaughlin, Reducing Unjustified Sentencing Disparity: United States
v. Meza, 127 F. 3d 545 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1103 (1998), 107 YALE
L.J. 2345, 2345–50 (1998); Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Editors’ Observations: Perspectives on Disparity in Guideline Research, 4. FED. SENT’G REP. 123, 123–25 (1991);
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 1, 2–5 (2013).
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(1) Admitting Individualizing Evidence at Trial. In order to
determine whether an actor has a required offense culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or excuse,
the court shall not admit into evidence at trial a factor or
group of factors that:
(a) did not have a significant effect in bringing about the
actor’s offense conduct; or
(b) the use of which to reduce liability would be seen by
the community as so abhorrent as to undermine the
criminal law’s moral credibility.
(c) A factor that is not disqualified under Subsections (a)
or (b) may be taken into account by the decisionmaker if it is relevant to whether the actor satisfies
an offense culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or excuse.
(2) Taking Account of an Individualizing Factor. When taking account of an individualizing factor, the decisionmaker shall consider:
(a) in cases of control failure, the extent to which this
actor could have been expected to have resisted the influence of the factor in bringing about the offense
conduct, which includes taking special account of:
(i) the seriousness of the offense;
(ii) the strength of the factor’s influence in bringing
about the actor’s offense conduct; and
(iii) the capacity of this actor to resist the factor’s
influence;
(b) in cases of mistake, the extent to which the actor
could have been expected to have avoided the mistake
giving rise to liability, which includes taking special
account of:
(i) the seriousness of the offense;
(ii) the sincerity of the actor’s mistaken belief as to
the existing circumstances; and
(iii) the sincerity of the actor’s belief that their conduct was not wrongful;
(c) the extent to which the actor was at fault:
(i) in bringing about the factor or its influence; or
(ii) in failing to take an opportunity to avoid or escape
the factor or its influence; and
(d) whether use of the factor in this instance to mitigate liability would communicate approval or acceptance
of a perspective or belief that would offend the norms and
values of the community within the jurisdiction.
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Note that it is not this statute on partial individualization that will
itself determine whether an actor is excused or gains a mitigation. The
only function of this provision is to identify what partially individualizing
factors ought to be taken into account and what weight they should be
given when applying the terms of a culpability, mitigation, or excuse doctrine. It is those provisions that provide the specific standards that the
decision-maker is to apply, for example, in assessing the actor’s culpable
state of mind at the time of the offense or in assessing whether the actor
showed enough firmness in resisting duress.
D. The Proposed Provision in Operation
To provide some detail on how the proposed formulation would
work, this Article provides below a short commentary on each Subsection.
SECTION (1). ADMITTING INDIVIDUALIZING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. Section
(1) takes up the preliminary issue of whether evidence of an individualizing factor should be admitted at trial. Two grounds of exclusion are provided. In Subsection (a), individualizing factors are excluded if they had
no significant effect on the offender’s commission of the offense, as in the
case of an offender charged with extortion who can point to a mental
disorder short of an insanity defense. The factor may have some relevance
in some contexts but may be insufficiently related to the offense at hand to
justify admission at trial.
A second basis for exclusion, in Subsection (b), is an individualizing
factor, such as racial animus, that the community would find abhorrent to
allow to mitigate liability and punishment, so much so that such use would
undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. Other such factors might
include anti-Semitism, misogyny, or homophobia where, if mitigation were
offered on the basis of one of these beliefs, the criminal justice system
would seem to condone or at least accept such discrimination and hate.
Subsection (c) makes explicit what is implicit from the two previous
Subsections: any factor not disqualified under Subsection (a) or (b) can in
fact be admitted at trial “if it is relevant to whether the actor satisfies an
offense culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or excuse.” Of
course, even if not excluded by Section (1), there are many other reasons
why a particular piece of evidence might be excluded at trial, depending
on the rules of evidence at play in the particular jurisdiction.
SECTION (2). TAKING ACCOUNT OF AN INDIVIDUALIZING FACTOR. When
an individualizing factor is admissible at trial, Section (2) provides specific
guidance to decision-makers about how an individualizing factor should
be treated by providing a range of questions to ask, the answers to which
may suggest that the individualizing factor be given more weight, less
weight, or no weight.
Subsection (2)(a) provides such guidance in relation to cases involving failure of control, as commonly arises in cases of provocation, extreme
emotional disturbance, duress, and involuntary intoxication. Subsection
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(2)(b) provides such guidance for cases where the individualizing factor is
offered as relevant to why an offender made a mistake, commonly arising
in cases relating to recklessness, negligence, and mistake as to justification.
There are conceptual parallels between the critical inquiries in the loss of
control cases and in the mistake cases, but the language used in the two
contexts is necessarily different.
SUBSECTION (2)(A). CONTROL FAILURE CASES. Control failure cases
are those in which an external or internal pressure is imposed on, or arises
in, an offender so forcefully that the offender struggles to exercise selfrestraint or feels compelled or coerced to act. Such cases might arise in
the doctrine of duress, provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, involuntary intoxication, or certain paraphilias, where an individualizing factor
may play a role in bringing about the circumstances that led to the offense, diminishing the defendant’s ability to resist the offense, or increasing her susceptibility to other criminogenic factors. In such cases, the
proposed individualization provision asks the decision-maker to consider
whether the offender could have been expected to have resisted the influence of the factor. Here, the word “expected” is crucial, suggesting that
the inquiry is a normative one in which the trier of fact is meant to ask
what conduct was rightfully due from the actor in the circumstances. The
answer to this normative question is the product of three areas of inquiry:
the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the factor’s influence, and
the capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s influence.
Subsection (2)(a)(i). Seriousness of the Offense. The first inquiry considers
both the harm caused in physical or pecuniary damage and the moral
wrongness of the offense. It also takes into account any relevant factors
regarding the victims of the offense, including their relationship to the
defendant and their particular vulnerabilities, such as age or disability.
The more serious the offense, the more the offender could have been
expected to resist the influence of the factor.322 It is worth noting that
this analysis rejects a deterministic picture of criminal conduct but rather
assumes that offenders are mostly capable of choosing their conduct. One
can imagine the actor being pushed and pulled by various countervailing
forces, but it is assumed such forces rarely fully override her decision-making capacity.
Consider, for example, the case of Donna Marie Ely, a young woman
with a mild intellectual disability, who is repeatedly physically and verbally
abused by her boyfriend.323 Ely and her boyfriend live with their four
young children but they rarely leave the house.324 Ely hates her boy322. See Eldad Yechiam, Jason E. Kanz, Antoine Bechara, Julie C. Stout, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Elizabeth M. Altmaier & Jane S. Paulsen, Neurocognitive Deficits
Related to Poor Decision-Making in People Behind Bars,15 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV.
44 (2008) (reporting neuroscience study finding that murder and armed robbery
require more complex, thoughtful, decision making than lesser crimes).
323. Commonwealth v. Ely, 554 A.2d 118, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
324. Id.
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friend’s abusive behavior but she depends on him and is overwhelmed by
the prospect of leaving him.325 Over time, Ely’s boyfriend starts sexually
abusing the couple’s children.326 Ely is aware of the abuse and wants to
protect her children but is afraid.327 Eventually, her boyfriend asks Ely to
partake in the abuse. Ely feels that she cannot refuse, so she sexually assaults her children and helps her boyfriend to rape their daughter.328
The abuse continues for nearly a year. Ultimately, Ely is charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and a litany of other childwelfare related offenses.329
On the one hand, Ely might be able to argue that she acted under
duress and that her judgment was clouded by the symptoms of battered
spouse syndrome. On the other hand, the offense is so terribly serious
that one could conclude that she should have done more to resist it.
While we might understand if she retaliated physically against her boyfriend, given all his abuse, it seems unfathomable that she should assault
her children, especially for such a long period of time and in such a morally condemnable manner. This was not a spanking or a slap on the wrist,
but an extraordinary violation of bodily autonomy with potentially farreaching physical and psychological consequences. Balancing the weight
of a significant, but non-imminent, physical threat with an offense so serious that it would likely violate any mother’s basic instincts could well yield
the conclusion that the woman could have been expected to have resisted
her boyfriend’s influence and therefore should not be eligible for a significant mitigation. Ultimately, while a decision-maker ought to take the individualizing circumstances into account, the seriousness of the offense may
lead them to give the factors much less weight than they might otherwise.
Subsection (2)(a)(ii). Strength of the Factor’s Influence. The second inquiry in the ambit of control-failure cases concerns the causal force of the
factor in bringing about the actor’s offending conduct. Once again, the
picture of causation is not deterministic or absolute. Rather, the factor is
one of many influences playing out in an offender’s life and affecting his
deliberations over the course of action to pursue. Circumstances that affect the strength of the factor’s influence might include the frequency
with which the actor is exposed to, or acted upon, the individualizing factor, as in the case of a battered spouse who is repeatedly physically assaulted by her husband. The overall effect of the factor in its impact on
the personal identity of the actor can also be relevant, as where a
homophobic slur is directed at a gay person or a racial epithet at a Black
person. Finally, an assessment of the strength of the factor’s influence
may involve pathological considerations as where the factor is some sort of
325. See id. at 120 (Rowley, J. dissenting) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 7, Ely,
381 Pa. Super. Ct. 510554 A.2d 118).
326. Id. at 120–22.
327. See id. at 120.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 118.
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addiction or involves a paraphilia. The stronger the factor’s influence in
bringing about the offense conduct, the less the actor could have been
expected to have resisted its influence.
Consider, for example, the Gounagias case discussed previously.330
Recall that the offender is a young man, recently immigrated from Greece,
who is sodomized by his roommate while unconscious and subsequently
mocked and derided by his co-workers, friends, and neighbors, who are
his only connections in the U.S.331 After a particularly humiliating round
of taunts at the local coffee shop, Gounagias returns to his dormitory and
shoots his victimizer while the man sleeps.332 He is denied a provocation
mitigation and is charged and convicted of first-degree murder.333
Here, Gounagias’s individualizing factors are the sexual assault and
repeated humiliation that he suffers, both of which are enormously powerful in their effect. Over the course of three weeks, Gounagias is constantly
reminded and taunted about what was arguably the worst event in his life.
The series of small, painful provocations occur constantly, unavoidably,
and without respite, and increasingly haunt Gounagias at his place of
work, at his home, and at the local eateries he frequents. As a socially
isolated, recent immigrant, the strength of these factors is all the more
intense as life in this community is all he knows and all he can imagine for
himself in the U.S. Acknowledging the full gamut of contextual factors at
play, it is easier to understand why Gounagias failed to resist their
influence.
Subsection (2)(a)(iii). Capacity of the Actor to Resist the Factor’s Influence.
The final inquiry in control-failure cases concerns the capacity of the actor
to resist the factor’s influence. This assessment is maybe the most difficult
because it requires the trier of fact to make a folk psychological judgment
about the actor’s individual competencies—particularly the actor’s ability
to exercise self-control or to withstand external pressures—without necessarily fully understanding the scope of the actor’s lived experiences and
faculties. Criminal law cases are each a snapshot of a person’s life, and the
trier of fact will always have to make judgments about the actor in light of
information deficits. That being said, decision-makers are capable of developing notions of an offender’s capacities based on factors such as the
offender’s prior conduct, age, intellectual development, relative social isolation, handicaps the offender might suffer, and a host of other factors
relevant to the offender’s ability to withstand the pressure toward the offensive conduct. There are also cases where the influencing factor is so
integral to the individual’s identity or sense of self that we can easily understand her limitations in resisting it, as might be the case for a Holocaust survivor confronted with a barrage of anti-Semitic insults. The less
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Section II.A.
State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915).
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the actor is capable of resisting the factor’s influence, the less she could
have been expected to have resisted committing the offense toward which
it pressed.
Consider, for example, the case of Barry Kingston, a man who has
occasional pedophilic desires but who has never acted on them because he
believes they are morally wrong.334 Due to an unrelated dispute at work,
Kingston’s employer seeks to blackmail him and contracts with a wellknown local criminal who, after some digging, learns of Kingston’s sexual
preferences.335 The criminal invites a teenage boy to his house, drugs
him, undresses him, and poses his unconscious body suggestively on a
bed.336 The criminal then invites Kingston over to his house and drugs
him as well, but with less of a dose.337 Feeling groggy, Kingston asks the
criminal if he has put something in his drink.338 Instead of answering, the
criminal leads Kingston to the naked boy and tells Kingston that he should
have sex with the boy.339 After hesitating, Kingston, in his confused and
drugged state, sexually assaults the boy, while the criminal secretly films
him.340 Kingston is charged with indecent assault on a minor, but he has
no recollection of the evening.341
In assessing Kingston’s capacity to resist the offense, the involuntary
intoxication is highly relevant. Certainly, Kingston had the capacity to resist his pedophilic urges, and in fact, did so repeatedly over the course of
his life. But the effect of the drugging and reducing his ability to resist,
especially given the added nudges of the criminal leading him to the teenage boy and encouraging him to assault him, seem highly significant in
assessing Kingston’s blameworthiness. The court concludes that, “a
drugged intent is still an intent,” and Kingston is convicted.342 But one
might conclude that, while the pedophilia tendencies admittedly were his
own, his lack of capacity to resist them, through no fault of his own, ought
to be given significant weight in judging whether to eliminate or reduce
his criminal liability.
SUBSECTION (2)(B). MISTAKE CASES. Mistake cases focus on the actor’s capacity to have avoided the mistake that gave rise to the offense. In
mistake cases, unlike control-failure cases, the mistake does not cause the
conduct per se but rather brings about the circumstances in which the actor feels free to engage in the offense conduct. Such mistake may arise,
334. Regina v. Kingston [1994] 2 AC 355 (HL) (appeal taken from the Court
of Appeal (Criminal Division)).
335. Id.
336. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES
117–19 (4th ed. 2010).
337. See id.
338. See id. at 118.
339. See id.
340. See id. at 119.
341. Regina v. Kingston [1994] 2 AC 355 (HL) (appeal taken from the Court
of Appeal (Criminal Division)).
342. Id.
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for example, where the actor misjudged the seriousness, imminence, or
existence of a perceived threat against her; makes an error about whether
her conduct was criminally prohibited; or mistakenly believed that she was
justified in her conduct. The less the actor could have been expected to
have avoided the mistake, the more she is deserving of some sort of reduction in liability.
The proposed formulation asks the decision-maker in mistake cases to
take special account of three factors: the seriousness of the offense, the
sincerity of the actor’s mistaken belief in the existing circumstances, and
the sincerity of the actor’s mistaken belief that her conduct was not wrongful. This list of factors is not intended to be fully comprehensive. Certainly, other factors might arise in mistake cases that shed light on the
offender’s blameworthiness. However, as a practical matter, these three
factors seem to commonly play a large role in such cases.
Subsection (2)(b)(i). Seriousness of the Offense. As with the control-failure
cases, the first inquiry concerns the seriousness of the offense. The more
serious the offense, the more one would have expected the actor to have
avoided making the mistake leading to the offense. In general, people are
expected to ensure that they are acting on correct information and beliefs
when they exercise lethal force or put another at risk of physical harm, for
example. We expect a hunter to be certain that his target is a deer and
not a hiker when he pulls the trigger. This expectation is less strong in
cases where the offense is purely pecuniary or where another person’s life
does not hang in the balance.
Consider, for example, the case of Dale and Leilani Neumann, a
deeply religious couple who live in a rural, isolated Pentecostalist community.343 Over the course of three months, they observe their eleven-yearold daughter’s health deteriorate.344 She grows increasingly lethargic and
pale, and has difficulty eating and breathing.345 The couple love their
daughter dearly and apply every form of spiritual remedy they can think
of, but they do not take her to a doctor as they believe that only God can
heal.346 One morning, they find their daughter unconscious and having
difficulty breathing.347 The couple invite over their prayer group and
Church elders, but those persons’ efforts do not work.348 At last, a
Church elder calls an ambulance, but when paramedics arrive the girl is
pronounced dead.349 The cause of her death is diabetic ketoacidosis, an

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
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easily preventable illness.350 The Neumanns are charged and convicted of
reckless homicide.351
Here, the Neumanns have made a clear mistake with respect to the
care of their child, resulting in the gravest outcome imaginable. Their
religious faith tended to blind them to the risk. While the parents may
argue that they honestly believed that a doctor could not do anything for
their daughter’s health that God could not do, this mistaken belief effectively denied their child the medical care needed to save her. With their
daughter’s condition rapidly declining, and the intensive prayer sessions
having no real effect, the Neumanns should have recognized the seriousness of the situation and thought more critically about their actions. They
knew that the stakes were high—their daughter’s health was rapidly declining—and calling an ambulance at the eleventh hour was a highly uncertain backstop. While it may be appropriate to take into account the
individualizing factor of their religious beliefs, the more serious the potential consequences, the more we can expect a parent to reevaluate the need
to consider alternative possibilities.
Subsection (2)(b)(ii). Sincerity of Mistaken Belief About Existing Circumstances. The second inquiry in mistake cases focuses on the sincerity of the
offender’s belief in the existing circumstances. This inquiry focuses
strictly on the actor’s perception of the material facts and the sincerity of
her belief in them. For example, did the defendant honestly believe that
the package she drove across state lines contained laundry detergent and
not heroin? Did the defendant honestly believe that he was shooting a
wild dog that had crept onto his property, and not a neighbor he had
been quarreling with? The primary questions raised by this inquiry are
first, whether the actor’s belief was deeply and sincerely held, and second,
whether or not the actor’s mistaken belief is understandable given all that
is known about the actor and the situation in which she found herself.
The more deeply held an actor’s mistaken belief and the more understandable the mistake given the actor’s situation, the less she can be expected to have avoided it, and the more her individualizing circumstances
are appropriately used to reduce liability.
Recall the case of James Law discussed previously,352 in which a Black
man who moves into a predominantly white suburb in Maryland in the
1970s is burglarized and threatened by his racist neighbors.353 When, a
few nights after the incident, Law hears what he believes to be someone
trying to unlock his back door, he immediately believes it is another racially motivated break-in.354 In fact, the man fiddling with the back door
is a police officer responding to a call from a sympathetic neighbor who
350. Id. at 572 (“A pediatric endocrinologist testified that, if treated, diabetic
ketoacidosis has a 99.8% survival rate.”).
351. Id.
352. See supra Section II.B.
353. Law v. State, 318 A.2d 859 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
354. Id. at 861.
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believes someone is breaking into Law’s house again.355 Unable to see the
officer’s uniform, Law shoots through the door, killing the officer. Law is
charged with first-degree murder.356
Here, Law’s mistake with respect to the existing circumstances seems
both understandable and honestly held. He had just been victimized by a
nearly identical attack; he sincerely believed that his racist neighbors were
conspiring against him and would return to harass him; and, as a Black
man living in a highly segregated area during racially fraught times, he
had reason to think that a subsequent attack might threaten his life or the
life of one of his family members. Thus, while Law’s mistake was tragically
quite costly, leading to the death of an innocent person, it is understandable that he could have made such a mistake in the circumstance and honestly so. A decision-maker could conclude, then, that the individualizing
factors of the situation are entirely appropriate to take into account as the
basis for a mitigation or excuse.
Subsection (2)(b)(iii). Mistaken Belief That Conduct Not Wrongful. The final inquiry for mistake cases examines the actor’s mistaken belief that her
conduct was not wrongful. Criminal liability depends on the assumption
that criminal violations entail some sort of consciousness of wrongdoing.
In that sense, in cases where the actor honestly but mistakenly believes
that her conduct is not wrongful, she may be entitled to have an individualizing factor taken into account if her mistake was sincere and understandable, as with the mistake of fact inquiry discussed in the Subsection
above. The inquiry here is somewhat more complicated, however. It requires an assessment of more than just what perceived facts are believable,
an inquiry that is well within the life experience of most jurors. Here, the
issue calls for the more complex judgment about our expectation that
people will know the moral status of their conduct. This means, for example, that jurors must evaluate the sincerity and understandability of beliefs
derived from religious teachings, cult indoctrination, and cultural influences, none of which they themselves have experienced. And such cases
might include a wide range of serious offenses, such as honor killings,
female genital mutilation, rape-based bride selection, or parent-child suicides. In each instance, jurors are asked to try to put themselves in the
defendant’s situation and to try to faithfully judge the strength and understandability of the belief given that situation.
Consider, for example, the case of Fumiko Kimura, discussed previously.357 Recall that a Japanese mother who immigrated to the U.S. more
than twenty years ago learns that her husband has been having an affair
with another woman for several years.358 Distraught, she feels that the
355.
356.
357.
358.
A-091133
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only way to rid herself of the shame is to commit parent-child suicide, a
practice that is tolerated in parts of Japan.359 She tries to drown herself
and her children in the ocean, but two beachgoers intervene. Kimura
lives, but her two children die. She is charged with first-degree murder.360
Kimura might argue that her mistaken belief that her conduct was not
wrong should be taken into account because parent-child suicide was accepted as a legitimate practice in her native culture. However, while it
may be appropriate to consider the individualizing factor, the proposed
formulation might lead the decision-maker to be somewhat skeptical
about how much weight it should be given. Having been in the U.S. for
twenty years, could a jury have some question about whether Kimura genuinely and understandably saw the killing of her children as not wrongful?
SUBSECTION (2)(C). EXTENT TO WHICH THE ACTOR WAS AT FAULT FOR
HAVING OR RETAINING THE INDIVIDUALIZING FACTOR. Subsection (2)(c) applies to both the failure-to-control cases of Subsection (2)(a) and the mistake cases of Subsection (2)(b). It moves beyond the situation that existed
at the time of the offense and has the decision-maker consider the offender’s experiences before the offense. Was the actor at fault in creating
the conditions that led to his criminal conduct? The presumption of this
Subsection is that an individualizing factor should not be taken into account when the actor has knowingly brought it upon himself or willfully
retained it when he could have escaped its influence.
Subsection (2)(c)(i). Bringing About the Factor. The first inquiry considers whether an offender was at fault in bringing about the factor or its
influence. Of special interest here will be those cases in which the offender is responsible for their individualizing factor—that is, the existence
or the coerciveness of the factor was of their own creation. Such cases
would include instances where the offender was not born or raised with
the individualizing factor but rather came to the factor of their own volition, as where an uncoerced adult joins a destructive cult or gang, or
where a person abuses drugs that make them more prone to violence.
Consider, for example, the case of Harvey Kobayashi, a JapaneseAmerican, Buddhist in his forties who is raised to always be selfless and put
others’ needs before his own.361 He sincerely believes that there is no
greater shame than not being able to satisfy others’ needs.362 Kobayashi
struggles socially, but using a phone-based dating service, he meets a woman that he comes to trust and think of as his girlfriend.363 Unbeknownst
to Kobayashi, though, the woman is a scam artist.364 She starts to ask
Kobayashi for money, and he obliges. Over time, the woman’s schemes
359. Id. at 994–96.
360. Id. at 995.
361. People v. Kobayashi, No. B157685,2003 WL 1558226, at *1, *4, *6, *8 &
n.18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
362. Id. at *5.
363. Id. at *1.
364. Id. at *2
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escalate, and, unable to say no to her requests, Kobayashi spends upwards
of $250,000 on her.365 Kobayashi files for bankruptcy and moves back in
with his parents.366 One day, the woman asks Kobayashi to come to her
apartment, where she demands that he buy her a house.367 She yells and
swears at Kobayashi, threatening to kill his mother if he does not buy the
house for her. Suddenly, feeling like he has no other way out of the situation, Kobayashi grabs a knife and stabs the woman, killing her.368 He is
charged with first-degree murder.369
While Kobayashi endured an extraordinary amount of harassment
and strife leading up to his offense, to a large extent he brought these
difficulties upon himself. His refusal to say no, despite every indication
that the woman was not really his friend, laid the foundation for his subsequent criminal conduct. By allowing himself to be so severely exploited,
he created the circumstances in which he was vulnerable to a provocation
that he might otherwise have shrug off. Thus, while his special circumstances leading to the offense might be taken into account, the decisionmaker could decide to give them less weight because of his own role in
bringing them about.
Subsection (2)(c)(ii). Failing to Avoid or Escape. The second inquiry of
this Subsection concerns cases in which the offender had an opportunity
to escape the individualizing factor or its influence but failed to take such
opportunity. This inquiry does not demand heroics on the part of the
offender. A teenage offender whose crime is related to her upbringing in
an impoverished, violent neighborhood would not be expected to have
avoided her conduct if it could be shown that some opportunity to leave
the neighborhood arose when she was a child. At that point in her life, it
may not have been realistic to think that she understood the implications
of passing up the opportunity. But in instances where an offender had
concrete avenues to avoid the individualizing factor’s influence, a failure
to do so appropriately reduces the weight that such factor should be given
as the basis for mitigation. If an individual who knows he has serious
pedophilia takes a wrong turn and finds himself in front of an elementary
school, the presumption is that he should immediately leave and take the
necessary precautions to avoid committing an offense. The greater the
missed opportunity to escape or avoid the factor and its influence, the less
weight a decision-maker may attribute to the factor.
Consider, for example, the case of Gabriel Heinemann, a teenage boy
who, while visiting family in Connecticut, meets a teenage girl who he is
attracted to.370 The girl invites him to hang out with her and her friends
at her friend’s house, but when they arrive, two older boys are there, carry365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
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ing guns and wearing bulletproof vests.371 Heinemann is afraid but wants
to appear relaxed and comfortable in front of the girl he likes, so he does
not voice his concerns.372 Later that night, the older boys ask Heinemann
to drive the group to a drug dealer’s house in order to procure cocaine.373
Heinemann agrees and waits outside while the older boys enter the house,
but he grows increasingly nervous and drives to a nearby gas station.374
Twenty minutes later, Heinemann returns and discovers that the older
boys are accidentally inside the wrong house, and there are no drug dealers inside, only an older couple.375 The older boys have tied up the homeowners and are holding guns to their heads while demanding the
combination to their safe.376 The older boys ask Heinemann to open the
safe and, terrified, he attempts to do so, but his hands are shaking so
much that he is unable to do so.377 Heinemann is charged with burglary,
robbery, larceny, and theft of a firearm.378
The case of Gabriel Heinemann offers an example of an incident in
which the offender was given opportunities to avoid the influence of the
individualizing factor that produced his conduct—coercion by the older
boys—but did not take steps to do so. Heinemann may try to argue that
he was acting under duress because he was so afraid of the older boys but,
ultimately, such an argument is undermined by his opportunities to escape. While it may be appropriate to take into account the coercion applied by the older boys, the offender’s opportunities to escape their
influence means that the decision-maker can appropriately give such factors little weight.
The case of Fumiko Kimura, discussed immediately above, might also
be viewed as an example of this sort. Even if one were persuaded that she
genuinely believed the killing of her children was not wrongful, one might
nonetheless conclude that living in the U.S. for twenty years had given her
plenty of time and opportunity to appreciate that such a view could be
very wrong.
SUBSECTION (2)(D). TAKING ACCOUNT OF FACTOR WOULD COMMUNICATE APPROVAL OR ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFENSIVE VIEW. Subsection (d), the
final subsection, affords the decision-maker the opportunity to predictively
assess the negative effect on the criminal law’s moral credibility if such an
offensive factor were allowed to mitigate liability and punishment. Recall
that, in extreme instances, such a concern can be the basis for excluding
such evidence of an individualizing factor from trial altogether, under
Subsection (1)(b). In most cases, however, the court is likely to admit the
371.
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evidence. But this Subsection draws the jury’s attention to this potential
problem and asks the jury to take it into account in determining how
much weight, if any, should be given to a particular individualizing factor.
The reasoning underlying this provision is the reasoning sketched
above in Section I.B, as well as in Subsection (1)(b) of the proposed formulation: to allow condemnable beliefs and values to provide the basis for
mitigation risks having the criminal law seen as accepting or even approving such beliefs and values. Such a perception would be seriously problematic both because it could undermine society’s condemnation of such
views and could undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility with the
community, and thereby its crime-control effectiveness, for apparently taking such a position. Thus, where questionable beliefs and values are not
excluded from admission at trial, the jury should nonetheless take account
of the potentially detrimental effects—to both society’s norms and the
criminal law’s moral credibility—of giving weight to any particular individualizing factor.
Consider, for example, the case of Dong Lu Chen discussed previously.379 Recall that a Chinese immigrant learns that his wife is cheating
on him and is so overcome with shame and rage that he kills her in what
he believes to be a legitimate cultural tradition designed to spiritually purify the family tree of a man who has been cuckolded.380 Chen believes
that killing his wife in this way is the only way to rid himself and his family
of the shame of her infidelity.381 He is charged with second-degree
murder.382
Chen might raise some sort of cultural defense, arguing that he sincerely and honestly believed that this cultural practice was not wrong and,
in any case, he assumed members of his community would interfere and
stop him from killing his wife if they thought his conduct inappropriate, as
was the standard cultural practice.383 The individualizing factor of his
Cantonese sub-culture would probably not be excluded under Section
(1)(b) of the formulation because it is not “so abhorrent as to undermine
the criminal law’s moral credibility.” But if the jury affords him a mitigation based on this factor, they are communicating something more sinister
to the wider community than civic liberalism or cultural tolerance.
Rather, such a mitigation would announce that in some circumstances, it
is acceptable for a man to kill his wife if she cheats on him if such infidelity
is especially shameful to him. The deeper implication here is a state-sanctioned devaluation of women’s lives; with the criminal law apparently conceding some apparent legitimacy to a cultural view that an unfaithful wife
379. See supra Section II.C.
380. People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989), cited in Spatz,
supra note 245, at 621–22.
381. Id.
382. See Bohlen, supra note 254.
383. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)Idenitifying Culture: Asian Women and the ‘Cultural Defense’, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 66–69 (1994).
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may deserve such killing. Many in the wider community may be horrified
by such a conclusion and may find the apparent acceptance of it by the
criminal law so troubling as to alter their judgment about the criminal
law’s moral credibility generally. As the group most in touch with community norms, jurors are best suited to fairly judge whether acceptance of a
particular individualizing factor would be so abhorrent to the community
as to undermine the criminal law’s reputation for moral justness.
IV. DO

THE

ISSUES OF PARTIAL INDIVIDUALIZATION EXIST
ADJUDICATION DOCTRINES?

IN

ALL

Recall from Section I.D that all principles of adjudication—primarily
offense culpability requirements, grading mitigations, and excuse defenses—serve a similar purpose of determining whether an offender deserves to be punished for their violation of the rules of conduct and, if so,
the general grade of their blameworthiness and deserved punishment. It
should be no surprise then to find that the same dynamics at work in the
partial-individualization doctrines discussed above—recklessness, negligence, provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, duress, involuntary
intoxication, and mistake as to justification—exist in many, if not all, doctrines of adjudication. Do these other doctrines successfully distinguish
between individualizing factors that should be taken into account and
those that should not? Do they provide cautionary guidance for how a
qualifying factor should be evaluated, as the analysis above provides? It
appears that they do not.
A. Complete Individualization: Using a Purely Subjective Requirement
Some exculpation doctrines are constructed in such a way as to shortcircuit any partial individualization inquiry by adopting a purely subjective
requirement. This is the case, for example, when purpose, knowledge,
belief, or awareness of risk in recklessness cases is set as an offense culpability requirement. If one sees value in the proposed individualization formulation’s exclusion of some factors and cautionary guidance in the use
of others, then the use of purely subjective requirements may be problematic. There may be cases in which an offender lacks the required subjective culpability because of individualizing factors that would be excluded
or at least critically questioned and evaluated under the proposed individualization formulation. For example, the proposed formulation would exclude some factors, such as racial or gender bias or homophobia, or would
insist on a critical evaluation of a variety of other factors, such as religious
belief or cultural background, yet these same factors may have an essential
role in shaping an offender’s belief or awareness of risk and thus are uncritically allowed to negate a required subjective culpability element.
Imagine for example that an immigrant comes from a culture in
which property is commonly shared. He sees items on a display table
outside a store and takes one on the false assumption that they are dis-
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played for the purpose of sharing. The offender cannot in fact be held
liable for theft because he does not satisfy the theft requirement that the
taking be with purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the property.
However, the individualization factor analysis presented here suggests that
one ought to also ask questions such as: was the actor at fault for not having adjusted to the existing societal customs and rules of his new culture?
The purely subjective inquiry of current law allows no such examination.
Or consider the case of the devout religious leader Robert Strong,
discussed above, who stabs one of his parishioners in the honest belief that
it will cause no harm because God will protect the man. Indeed, the act of
stabbing is itself to be a demonstration of God’s power and the leader’s
absolute devotion and belief.384 If the parishioner dies because the religious leader had no intention to kill, or even an awareness of a substantial
risk of causing serious bodily injury, he cannot be convicted of homicide,
aggravated assault, or even attempted murder. But wouldn’t one want to
ask the kinds of individualizing factor questions that the proposed individualization formulation insists upon, such as whether the actor could have
been expected to have avoided the mistake, with special attention to the
seriousness of the offense? Wouldn’t one want to ask whether the offender was at fault for forming such a mistaken view in the first place, or
for not having corrected it?
If an individualizing characteristic is normally to be excluded as inappropriate or to be subject to cautionary scrutiny under the proposed analysis and formulation, then the criminal law’s use of a completely subjective
requirement improperly short-circuits those inquiries. This suggests that
the proposed individualization analysis and formulation ought to be applied broadly to cover all doctrines of adjudication, whether they explicitly
present the individualization issue—such as through the use of a “reasonable” person standard—or whether they exclude or obscure the issue by
adopting a purely subjective requirement.385
384. People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y 1975).
385. On the other hand, it may well be that we ought not exclude from evidence any individualizing factor in these cases of complete individualization—at
least in the instance of the definition of culpability requirements of purpose,
knowledge, belief, and awareness of risk and recklessness. However, we probably
do want to condemn complete individualization in the case of excuses. All excuses
should have some objective limit to the subjective inquiry. The culpability requirements just noted, however, present a different issue because they are establishing a
hierarchy of culpability—ideally, they are making grading distinctions rather than
setting a criminal liability cut off. On the other hand, current criminal codes tend
to do a bad job of using these culpability requirements for grading distinctions.
They often have a single culpability requirement cut off, such as recklessness, and
do not aggravate liability for greater culpability (except in the most serious offenses, such as homicide). At the same time, they have no lesser offense based
upon negligence that will assure some criminal liability even for serious conduct
that does not meet the subjective awareness of risk requirement of recklessness. As
long as this kind of offense structure continues to exist in the United States, it may
be better to limit the application of a general provision excluding certain individu-
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B. Obscured Individualization
Some exculpation doctrines are structured in such a way as to obscure
the individualization issue. For example, the Model Penal Code’s involuntary intoxication and insanity defenses provide a defense when the jury
determines that the actor “lack[ed] substantial capacity” to appreciate the
criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.386 But that broad formulation allows a decisionmaker to take into account or to exclude from their analysis any factor
that they wish, without guidance or consistency.
Under the proposed analysis and formulation, racism, homophobia,
and pedophilic tendencies that played a role in the offender’s commission
of the offense might be excluded from consideration or at least be subject
to a variety of cautionary and potentially undermining queries, such as:
Was the actor at fault for bringing about or maintaining the individualizing factor? Did the actor have the capacity to resist the factor’s influence?
Yet, where the individualizing factor arises in the context of one of the
doctrines that obscures consideration of the individualization issue, these
morally condemnable individualizing factors are not weeded out via subjection to cautionary inquiries.
Recall, for example, the Kingston case in which the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated and in that state followed his pedophilic desires to
abuse a semiconscious teenager.387 Rather than simply asking the Model
Penal Code’s involuntary intoxication question of whether Kingston had
lost “substantial capacity” to control his conduct, wouldn’t one want to
also ask questions about the strength of the pre-existing pedophilic tendencies and his responsibility for having and maintaining them, as the
proposed individualization provision would do?
Thus, if the exclusion of some individualizing factors and the cautionary evaluation of others, as provided by the proposed formulation, are appropriate with regard to all adjudication doctrines, not just to those that
on their face raise the individualizing issue, then again, as with the purely
subjective inquiries discussed in the previous subsection, the proposed formulation ought to be applicable generally, to all doctrines of culpability,
mitigation, and excuse.
SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the answer to the individualization puzzle has eluded
scholars for so long because, it turns out, other than the two outright exclusions—factors that did not have a substantial effect in bringing about
alization factors to the operation of general excuses, and to bar its application to
subjective culpability requirements.
386. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
387. See supra Section III.D and Subsection 2(a)(iii); see also Regina v. Kingston [1994] 2 AC 355 (HL) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division)); ROBINSON, supra note 335, at 117–19.
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the offense and factors that if considered as a basis for mitigation would
sufficiently appall the community as to undermine the criminal law’s
moral credibility—there do not exist particular categories of factors that
should be taken into account and categories of factors that should not.
Instead, nearly any (non-excluded) individualizing factor may potentially
be appropriate to consider depending upon the series of critical inquiries
identified in the proposed analysis and formulation: the seriousness of the
offense, the strength of the factor’s influence in bringing about the offense, the capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s influence, the actor’s
fault in having and keeping the factor, and the conflict with community
norms and values in allowing the factor to contribute to mitigation or
excuse.
Our proposal, then, is to allow more liberal introduction of individualizing factors at trial, excluding only the two kinds of factors noted. However, while more evidence of individualizing factors might be introduced,
its use by juries, and by extension parties anticipating what juries might
do, would be subject to specific cautionary guidance. Juries would not be
left to decide for themselves, as is done today, whatever comes into their
minds regarding the significance of a factor. Instead, they would be given
a set of fairly detailed inquiries about the factor to guide their consideration of it in the case at hand. The proposed statutory formulation would
give jurors a checklist of inquiries about the individualizing factor, its effect, and the actor’s blameworthiness for such effect.
It is also shown that the individualization issue exists in essentially all
doctrines of adjudication—culpability requirements, grading mitigations,
and excuse defenses—but that the existing formulations of these doctrines
commonly short-circuit an important inquiry into the propriety of allowing such individualization. This suggests that the individualization formulation proposed here ought to have general application to all doctrines
of adjudication.

